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JUDGING THIRD-PARTY FUNDING
Victoria A. Shannon †

Third-party funding is an arrangement whereby an outside entity
finances the legal representation of a party involved in litigation or
arbitration. The outside entity – called a “third-party funder” – could be
a bank, hedge fund, insurance company, or some other entity or individual
that finances the party's legal representation in return for a profit. Thirdparty funding is a controversial, dynamic, and evolving phenomenon. The
practice has attracted both national headlines and the recent attention of
the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Advisory Committee recently declared that “judges currently have the
power to obtain information about third-party funding when it is relevant
in a particular case,” but the Committee did not provide any additional
guidance regarding how to determine the relevance of third-party funding,
what information to obtain, or from whom to obtain that information. This
Article provides that needed guidance.
This Article sets forth reinterpretations of procedural rules to provide
judges and arbitrators with disclosure requirements and a framework for
handling known issues as they arise. By interpreting the existing rules as
suggested in this Article, judges and arbitrators will be able to gain a better
sense of the prevalence, structures, and impact of third-party funding and
its effects (if any) on dispute resolution procedures. Over time, these
observations will reveal the true systemic impact of third-party funding and
contribute to developing robust third-party funding regulations.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THIRD-PARTY FUNDING AS A PARADIGM SHIFT IN
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Law students around the country will have to relearn the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure after they sit for the bar examination. The
Federal Rules Advisory Committee has proposed changes to eleven
Federal Rules and the deletion of the Appendix of the Forms, which will
take effect on December 1, 2015, unless the Supreme Court or Congress
takes contrary action. 1 Far more interesting than the proposed changes,
1

For example, the Supreme Court may decline to prescribe the amendments
before May 1, 2015 or, if the Supreme Court does prescribe the amendments, then
Congress may enact legislation to reject, modify, or defer the amendments before
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however, are the panoply of disruptive and paradigm-shifting revisions
that the Advisory Committee has earmarked for future consideration.2
The most monumental potential changes would address the controversial
and growing phenomenon of third-party funding, which is an
arrangement in which a party involved in a dispute seeks funding from
an outside entity for its legal representation instead of financing its own
legal representation. 3 The Advisory Committee stated in its December
2014 report that:
Discussion reflected concerns that third-party financing is a
relatively new and evolving phenomenon. It takes many forms
that may present distinctive questions. A study paper for the
ABA 20/20 Commission on Ethics 4 expressed the hope that
work will continue to study the impact of funding on counsel’s
independence, candor, confidentiality, and undivided loyalty.
The Committee agreed that the questions raised by third-party
financing are important. But they have not been fully identified,
and may change as practices develop further. In addition, the
Committee agreed that judges currently have the power to obtain
information about third party funding when it is relevant in a
particular case. An attempt to craft rules now would be
December 1, 2015. If the Supreme Court transmits the amendments and Congress
does not act, then by statute, the amendments will become law and take effect on
December 1, 2015. See infra note 73 for a complete explanation of the rules revision
process. See also Summary of the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, (Sep. 2014), 13, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2014.pdf
(quoting Rule 1). For a full discussion of the proposed revisions, see id. at 13-18
(summary of revisions), B-1 to B-77 (specific language of proposed revisions).
2
Examples of such changes include implementing electronic filing and service
of process for court documents and grappling with the question of whether attorney
fees are appropriate sanctions in light of deep concerns about cost shifting under the
“American Rule.” See Hon. David G. Campbell, Report of Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, (Dec. 2,
2014),
3-12,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV12-2014.pdf.
3
See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at 3-4.
4
See generally AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
(2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/201112
12_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informational_
report.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA WHITE PAPER] (describing how a lawyer
would handle a third-party funding arrangement within the existing Rules of
Professional Responsibility).
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premature. These questions will not be pursued now. 5
The Advisory Committee declared that federal judges clearly have
the power to handle third-party funding under the existing rules but did
not give any guidance on how to implement this mandate. 6 This
monumental pronouncement generates a multitude of questions without
providing ready answers. What is third-party funding? What are federal
judges’ responsibilities under the Federal Rules with respect to thirdparty funding? Which aspects of the federal rules are affected by thirdparty funding? How should judges determine what information to obtain
regarding third-party funding and from whom to obtain that information?
This article addresses these questions and provides guidance to federal
judges regarding how to interpret the existing Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure until the Advisory Committee decides to tackle the question of
rule revisions. This article also provides guidance to arbitrators regarding
how to handle third-party funding, since, as this article explains,
arbitration and litigation are inextricably intertwined, and rules of
arbitration procedure will likely not be revised any time soon either. 7
Finally, this article presents advice to the future Advisory Committee and
arbitral bodies that would revise procedural rules to address third-party
funding.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Part II of this
article introduces and defines third-party funding. Part III of this article
addresses the problems that arise due to the Federal Rules not addressing
third-party funding explicitly. Part IV of this article tackles the debate
the regarding whether to revise the Federal Rules or reinterpret the
existing rules and concludes that the Advisory Committee’s approach of
leaving third-party funding to judicial interpretation is the most
appropriate course of action at this time.
Part V proposes
reinterpretations of the existing Federal Rules that judges can implement
immediately when encountering third-party funding in a case. Part VI
provides advice to the Advisory Committee regarding how to revise the
Federal Rules in the future.

5

See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at 4 (internal footnote added by
this article’s author).
6
See id. at 3-4.
7
See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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II. THE PHENOMENON: WHAT IS THIRD-PARTY FUNDING?
Third-party funding 8 is an arrangement in which a party involved in
a dispute seeks funding from an outside entity for its legal representation
instead of financing its own legal representation.9 The outside entity –
called a “third-party funder” – finances the party's legal representation in
return for a profit. 10 The third-party funder could be a bank, hedge fund,
insurance company, or some other entity or individual. 11 If the funded
party is the plaintiff, then the funder contracts to receive a percentage or
fraction of the proceeds from the case if the plaintiff wins. 12 Unlike a
loan, the funded plaintiff does not have to repay the funder if it loses the
case or does not recover any money. 13 If the funded party is the defendant,
then the funder contracts to receive a predetermined payment from the
defendant, similar to an insurance premium, and the agreement may
include an extra payment to the funder if the defendant wins the case. 14
Third-party funding is rapidly increasing in prevalence around the
world in both litigation and arbitration. 15 Increasingly, banks, hedge
funds, and other financial institutions are funding the legal representation
of parties to litigation and arbitration cases as a type of investment. 16 This
phenomenon is growing in importance and is estimated to be a

The Advisory Committee used the terms “third-party funding,” “third-party
financing,” and “third-party litigation financing” in its report. See id. Some scholars
use the term “third-party litigation funding” or “litigation funding” to refer to this
phenomenon. This article intentionally uses the term “third-party funding”—
without the word “litigation”—because this article addresses funding of both
litigation and arbitration, domestically and internationally.
9
See generally Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third Party
Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV 1268 (2011) (defining third-party funding). A
party may also engage both a contingency fee attorney and a third-party litigation
funder to work together on its case.
10
See LISA BENCH NIEUWVELD & VICTORIA SHANNON, THIRD-PARTY FUNDING
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 4-11 (2012) (describing the players in third-party
funding, the types of funding relationships, and the effect of the type of funder on
the attorney-client relationship).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party Financing on
Transnational Litigation, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 159, 162, 180-181 (2011).
16
See generally Fulbrook Management LLC, Investing in Commercial Claims
Nutshell Primer, 22, (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.fulbrookmanagement.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/Nutshell-Primer.pdf.
8
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multibillion-dollar industry both domestically and internationally. 17 In
addition, depending on the structure of the funding arrangement, the
funder may legally control or influence aspects of the legal representation
or may completely take over the case and step into the shoes of the
original party. 18 The United States is home to dozens of funders of
consumer disputes, like personal injury claims and other tort claims, and
funders of large complex corporate disputes. 19 In light of its increasing
prevalence, there is a fascinating debate regarding the place of third-party

17

See, e.g., Jennifer Smith, Litigation Investors Gain Ground in U.S., WALL ST.
J.
(Jan.
12,
2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303819704579316621131
535960 (several funders have several hundreds of millions of dollars in assets under
management); Jennifer Smith, Investors Put Up Millions of Dollars to Fund
ST.
J.
(Apr.
7,
2013),
Lawsuits,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323820304578408794155
816934 (“…Gerchen Keller Capital LLC, a Chicago-based team that includes
former lawyers … has raised more than $100 million and says there is plenty of
room for newcomers given the size of the U.S. litigation market, which they put at
more than $200 billion, measuring the money spent by plaintiffs and defendants on
litigation.”); Vanessa O’Connell, Funds Spring Up to Invest in High-Stakes
Litigation, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2011), (“The new breed of profit-seeker sees a huge,
untapped market for betting on high-stakes commercial claims. After all, companies
will spend about $15.5 billion this year on U.S. commercial litigation and an
additional $2.6 billion on intellectual-property litigation, according to estimates by
BTI Consulting Group Inc., a Wellesley, Mass., research firm that surveyed 300
large companies in 2011.”); Excend, Press Release: Excend Engaged as Advisory
[sic] for Multi-Billion Dollar Judgment Litigation Funding, (May 1, 2012),
http://www.excend.com/press/2012-05-09-Excend-Engaged-as-Advisor-for-MultiBillion-Dollar-Judgment-Litigation-Funding.pdf.
18
See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 1052, at 8 (explaining that some
third-party funding arrangements are structured as an assignment in which the thirdparty funder becomes the claimant in the case and the original party is no longer
involved). For an in-depth treatment of assignment and insurance policies in the
third-party funding context, see generally, Anthony J. Sebok, Betting on Tort Suits
After the Event: From Champerty to Insurance, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 453 (2011);
Paul Bond, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1297 (2002); Terrence Cain, Third Party Funding of Personal Injury Tort
Claims: Keep the Baby and Change the Bathwater, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11 (2013);
Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329
(1987).
19
Regarding consumer disputes, there are over 30 third-party funding companies
funding consumer claims as members of the American Legal Finance Association
(ALFA), http://www.americanlegalfin.com/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2015), as well as
several other third-party funding companies that are not members of ALFA funding
consumer disputes. Regarding commercial disputes, see supra note 17.
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funding both in the American legal system and in the context of
international dispute resolution. 20
There are four main drivers of the third-party funding industry
worldwide. First, funders help individuals bring claims that they would
not otherwise be able to bring, which supports the public policy ideal of
increasing access to justice for indigent or disadvantaged persons.21
Second, many insolvent companies and small companies are seeking a
means to pursue valid claims that they could not otherwise afford to
pursue and that are too risky for a contingency fee attorney to accept.22

20

See, e.g., Mariel Rodak, It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the
Litigation Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503,
504, 508, 513-523, 523 n.113, 526-527 (2006); Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation
Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 56-57, 68-69, 72, 74, 77 (2004); Susan Lorde
Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place in the
United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 673, 673-685 (2008); Anthony J. Sebok, The
Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 72 n.36, 139 (2011); Courtney R.
Barksdale, All That Glitters Isn’t Gold: Analyzing the Costs and Benefits of
Litigation Finance, 26 REV. LITIG. 707, 735 (2007); Steinitz, supra note 9, at 13251336; Jason Lyon, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American
Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV 571, 608-609 (2010); Max Radin, Maintenance by
Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 74-75 (1935) (arguing for the regulation of
contingency fees in a way similar to today’s arguments for regulating third-party
funding); Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367,
377-439 (2009) (proposing defense-side funding in the United States that would be
similar to after-the-event insurance in Europe); Yifat Shaltiel & John Cofresi,
Litigation Lending for Personal Needs Act: A Regulatory Framework to Legitimize
Third Party Litigation Finance, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 347, 350-361 (2004)
(proposing a statute to regulate third-party funding for individual consumers). See
also infra note 116 and accompanying text.
21
See David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First
Empirical Look at Third Party Litigation Funding, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075, 1076
n.3, 1077 n.6, 1077 n.7 (2013) (reporting the results of their study on public data on
third-party funding available in Australia).
22
See Raconteur Media, Raconteur on Legal Efficiency, THE TIMES
(SUPPLEMENT),
7-9,
(Mar.
25,
2010),
http://np.netpublicator.com/netpublication/n89269938; Steinitz (2011), supra note
9, at 1275-1276, 1283-1284; Martin (2004), supra note 20, at 67 n.93; Martin (2008),
supra note 20, at 685; James D. Dana & Kathryn E. Spier, Expertise and Contingent
Fees: The Roles of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation, 9 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 349, 365-366 (1993); Doug Jones, Third-Party Funding of Arbitration,
paper given at Hot Topics in International Arbitration at SJ Berwin, 7 (London, Sep.
22, 2008) (on file with the author); Ralph Lindeman, “Third-Party Investors Offer
New funding Source for Major Commercial Lawsuits,” THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS (BNA) DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, vol. 0, no. 42, 1-8 (Mar. 5, 2010).
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Third, many large companies that are constantly sued (such as insurance
companies or manufacturers of dangerous products) are seeking a means
to even out the litigation line item on their balance sheets, and funders
can offer them a fixed payment system for managing their litigation costs
as defendants. 23 Fourth, the worldwide market turmoil over the past
several years has led many investors to seek investments not dependent
upon the financial markets, stock prices, or company valuations. 24 Each
litigation or arbitration matter is its own separate entity and is
independent from market conditions in terms of the value of the
underlying harm or liability. 25 This independence shields the third-party
funder’s investment and potential profit from the general uncertainty
present in the global financial markets. 26
Since litigation and arbitration have both become attractive
investment vehicles, unsurprisingly, both reputable and unsavory third23

See, e.g., Fulbrook Capital Management, LLC, Third-Party Litigation
WORLDWIDE,
(May
2012),
Funding,
FINANCIER
http://www.fulbrookmanagement.com/third-party-litigation-funding/ (“Third-party
funding offers corporate clients the opportunity to move the financial risk and cost
of litigation off their balance sheets.”); Kevin LaCroix, What’s Happening Now?
Litigation Funding, Apparently, THE D&O DIARY, (Apr. 9, 2013)
http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/04/articles/securities-litigation/whatshappening-now-litigation-funding-apparently/ (“Litigation funding proponents
contend that the funding arrangements helps to level the playing field by allowing
litigants to pursue lawsuits against better financed opponents, or simply allowing
litigants to keep litigation costs off their balance sheet. It seems clear that as the
litigation funding field grows, the funding companies are offering new approaches
– for example, the defense side option that the Gerchen Keller firm will be offering,
or the ‘defense costs cover’ that provided protection for prospective RBS claimants
sufficient for them to be able to take on litigation in the U.K. notwithstanding the
‘loser pays’ litigation model that prevails there.”); David Lat, Litigation Finance:
(Apr.
8,
2013)
The
Next
Hot
Trend?,
ABOVETHELAW.COM,
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/04/litigation-finance-the-next-hot-trend/
(“Ashley
Keller [of Gerchen Keller Capital]: You’re certainly right that a lot of these clients
have balance sheet capacity and could fund out of pocket. Notwithstanding their
balance sheet capacities, there might be institutional constraints. If a company has a
$5 billion claim, it will pursue it. But what if it has a $50 million or $100 million
claim? If you’re a general counsel, a lot of C-suite executives are viewing your office
as a cost center. It’s not that easy to walk to the CFO’s office and ask for $5 million
or $10 million to finance offensive litigation. That will immediately hit the P&L of
the company and affect earnings per share, but the outcome is uncertain and
contingent. We think a fair number of meritorious claims are being left on the table
notwithstanding balance sheet capacity.”).
24
See Steinitz (2011), supra note 9, at 1283-1284.
25
See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 1052, at 12.
26
Id.
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party funders have flocked to this market. 27 However, despite the
existence of so many funders, there is little regulation of the industry at
present, and the existing regulations are not comprehensive. 28 The lack
of regulation or guidelines is creating a situation in which potential clients
of third-party funding have no way of knowing which funders are
reputable and which are untrustworthy. 29 Market regulation would help
inform consumers of the baseline requirements for a compliant thirdparty funder. 30 It would also inform noncompliant funders of what they
need to do to become compliant if they do not want to lose the business
of well-informed clients or want to avoid sanctions. 31 Scholars,
legislators, judges, attorneys, and even funders themselves have called
for regulation of the third-party funding industry. 32 As a first step, the
Advisory Committee has charged judges with devising ways to handle
issues that may arise with respect to third-party financing while also
27

For an example of a less savory third-party funding situation, see Weaver,
Bennett & Bland, P.A. v. Speedy Bucks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450-42 (W.D.N.C.
2001) (federal district court awarded treble damages to a law firm against a thirdparty funder for tortious interference with the law firm’s retainer agreement with its
client due to the how the funder’s compensation was calculated in the third-party
funding agreement with the same client).
28
See, generally, Heather Morton, Litigation or Lawsuit Funding Transactions
2014 Legislation, National Conference of State Legislatures, Jun. 4, 2014,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/litigation-fundingtransactions-2014-legislation.aspx (listing proposed and passed legislation state by
state); Richard A. Blunk, Have the States Properly Addressed the Evils of Consumer
Litigation
Finance?,
A
Model
Litigation
Finance
Contract,
http://litigationfinancecontract.com/have-the-states-properly-addressed-the-evilsof-consumer-litigation-finance/ (describing the third-party funding statutes in
Maine, Ohio, Nebraska and Oklahoma). As of June 2014, the states that have passed
legislation either allowing or prohibiting third-party funding of consumer claims are
Maine, Indiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Nebraska, New York (allowed for large
commercial disputes), and Tennessee. The states that have proposed legislation in
this area are Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana (other bills proposed), Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
Vermont. Other states either have case law or attorney ethics opinions. See
NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 1052, at 144-59 (51-jurisdiction survey of
existing state laws as of early 2012).
29
See generally, Victoria Shannon, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding
Regulation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 101 (2015) (forthcoming in Feb. 2015) (explaining
why existing regulations are insufficient and confusing and why the third-party
funding industry needs harmonized regulations in three areas: the procedure, the
transaction, and the ethics).
30
See id. at 107-08.
31
See id.
32
See supra notes 3 and 20.
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ensuring “‘the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.’” 33 However, an inequitable administration of the
Federal Rules or of rules of arbitration could lead to undesirable
inconsistencies, inefficiencies, and injustices. Thus, this article offers a
template for interpreting and administering the rules of litigation and
arbitration procedure to take into account the existence of third-party
funding.
This article builds on prior scholarly work that proposes a
harmonized regulatory framework for third-party funding in three
categories: the procedural, the transactional, and the ethical categories.34
A harmonized regulatory framework would include key regulation within
each of those three categories and would link those regulations together
through cross-references to create a harmonized regulatory framework.35
This approach would weave a regulatory “safety net” of minimum
standards for behaviors and interactions of the players in third-party
funding arrangements. 36 It would also ensure the integrity of a dispute
resolution system involving funders and the stability of any financial
products that may derive from third-party funding. 37
Regulations in the procedural category (set forth in this article)
address the ways in which funders participate in or influence the
procedure of litigation or arbitration, including the potential waiver of
evidentiary privileges for information disclosed to a funder. 38
Regulations in the transactional category would address the viability of
the funder as a business, including capitalization requirements, licensure,
and other best practices, such as disclosures to potential clients of
funders. 39 Regulations in the ethical category would address issues
relating to the conflicts of interest that may arise during the negotiation
of the funding arrangement, as well as the funder’s effect on the attorneyclient relationship. 40 This article focuses on the procedural regulations
and, specifically, suggests reinterpretations of litigation and arbitration
rules and certain evidentiary privileges to take into account the existence
and participation of third-party funders.

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

See supra note 1 (quoting Rule 1).
See Shannon (2015), supra note 29, at 107-08.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Shannon (2015), supra note 29, at 136-42; see also infra Part V.
See id. at 129-36.
See id. at 142-47.
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III. THE PROBLEM: RULES OF PROCEDURE ARE SILENT REGARDING
THIRD-PARTY FUNDING
Third-party funders are indirect participants in litigation and
arbitration, even if the decision maker (i.e., the judge, jury, or arbitrator),
the opposing party, and the opposing party's attorney are unaware of the
funder's participation. 41 Like other indirect participants in dispute
resolution, funders should be subject to the rules of litigation and
arbitration. 42 How should judges treat the participation of a third-party
funder in litigation or arbitration as a matter of procedure? Funders do
not fit neatly into any of the typical roles outlined in litigation or
arbitration rules. Funders are intentionally not parties or co-parties (in
order to avoid liability), 43 not legal counsel (although they are often
41

Parties often employ other entities to assist them in litigation without the
opposing side’s knowledge, such as non-testifying consultants, non-testifying
experts, accountants, and other agents. Several types of such entities are listed as
party “representatives” in FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B). See infra note 135 and
accompanying text. Based on the substance of their activities during the litigation,
funders fall with the definitions of those “representatives” enumerated in the rule in
the rules. Id.
42
See supra note 41. Since many entities that are not direct participants in
litigation are enumerated or referenced in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
third-party funders should also be referenced, as discussed throughout this article.
43
Furthermore, a third-party funder usually should not be joined as party. A
claim-side funder is not a “real party in interest” under FED. R. CIV. P. 17, unless the
funder buys the claim outright and takes an assignment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1)
(“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.”) (emphasis
added). The rule requires that the party possessing the substantive right at issue must
prosecute the case. The rule applies only to plaintiffs and is intended to prevent
defendants from having to face multiple lawsuits over the exact same legal right or
interest. See, e.g., Curtis Lumber Co. v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 618 F.3d 762, 771
(8th Cir. 2010) (stating that the purpose of FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a) is to ensure that the
defendant will face only one suit and will obtain the benefit of res judicata against
any future action based on the exact same legal interest); Marina Mangement
Services, Inc. v. Vessel My Girls, 202 F.3d 315, 318 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Rule 17(a)
protects a defendant against a subsequent claim for the same debt underlying a
previously entered judgment.”). If the funder takes an assignment of the claim, then
the funder should be the plaintiff on record in the case. Since such a funder would
pursue the claim or defense in its own name as the real party in interest, the funder
in such an instance would be treated as a party already under the existing rules. Most
funders, by contrast, take an interest only in the potential proceeds from the case
(claim side) or receive periodic payments from the client similar to an insurance
premium (defense side). Thus, FED. R. CIV. P. 17, as it is currently written, would
apply in the context of a funder taking an assignment of a claim and does not need
to be revised. The vast majority of third-party funders have absolutely no connection

Shannon – Judging Third-Party Funding

12

UCLA LAW REVIEW

3/17/2015 12:17 AM

[Vol. 63

lawyers), 44 and not witnesses (although disclosures of privileged
information to a funder may make that information discoverable by the
opposing side in jurisdictions that do not extend evidentiary privileges to
disclosures made to funders). 45 Funders are not amicus curiae (since they
do not make submissions, although they certainly support the position of
the funded party in the case). 46 They are certainly not judges, arbitrators,
courts or arbitral institutions (although they do make prima facie
determinations about the case that may determine whether the case
actually goes forward or not and, therefore, are similar to a judge or
arbitrator ruling on a motions to dismiss). 47 Funders are not third-party
beneficiaries of a contract, because they cannot enforce the funded
party’s claim independently of the funded party, unless they purchase the
claim outright and become a party through assignment. 48 Unlike
insurance companies, third-party funders usually do not agree to pay the
underlying judgment, so the insurance analogy does not quite fit either.49
Most funders think of themselves as investors, and an investor in
litigation or arbitration is a new species of participant uncontemplated in
the existing rules of procedure. 50
Although funders do not currently fit within any of the preexisting
defined roles in litigation or arbitration, they often find themselves pulled
into the proceedings either directly or indirectly. 51 For example, most
sophisticated funders are already aware of jurisdictions that allow courts
and arbitral tribunals to issue cost orders that can reach third parties or
allow parties to join funders as parties in cost proceedings. 52 In some
jurisdictions, funders view adverse costs orders or orders for security for
costs as simply the cost of doing business in that jurisdiction. 53 In the
whatsoever to the underlying substantive dispute; hence, they are not the “real party
in interest” under FED. R. CIV. P. 17.
44
Examples of third-party funders that have lawyers as leaders or principals
include ARCA Capital Partners, BridgePoint Financial Services, Burford Capital
Group, Calunius Capital, Fulbrook Management LLC, Gerchen Keller Capital,
Harbour Litigation Funding Ltd., IMF (Australia) Ltd., Bentham IMF Ltd., IM
Litigation Funding, The Judge Limited, Juridica Investments, and Therium.
45
See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
46
See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
47
See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
48
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
49
See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
50
See, generally, Max Volsky, INVESTING IN JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL FINANCES, LAWSUIT ADVANCES AND LITIGATION FUNDING (2013).
51
See, e.g., supra note 27; infra note 215.
52
See, e.g., NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 1052, at 27-28.
53
Id.
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United States, there are state long-arm statutes and a rather low threshold
for personal jurisdiction in light of the e-commerce age. 54 Thus, the
funder’s actions while funding litigation in a United States court may
create the “minimum contacts” that could subject it to the jurisdiction of
a United States court hearing a funded case or ruling on the enforcement
or annulment of a funded arbitral award. 55 Furthermore, arbitral tribunals
have previously issued cost orders against funders based on the domestic
rules of the procedural seat of arbitration, even though the funder has not
signed the underlying arbitration agreement. 56 Courts and arbitral
tribunals may also be able to exert jurisdiction over third-party funders
under doctrines that allow jurisdiction over a non-signatory to the
arbitration agreement or a non-signatory to the underlying contract who
has a financial interest in the outcome of the dispute. 57
Moreover, conflicts of interest may arise if a judge or arbitrator is
somehow linked to the third-party funder. 58 However, if the identity of
the funder is not disclosed at the outset, then the later revelation of the
connection could create disastrous and costly results for the parties.59
From the perspective of our legal system, the main purpose of the
involvement of a third-party funder is to reduce the funded party’s cost
burden and risk of losing the case. However, nondisclosure of a funder’s
participation can lead to additional costs for that party later. 60 For
example, additional costs may be incurred if a judge is accused of bias
under 28 U.S.C. § 144 because of her connection to a funder or has to
recuse herself under 28 U.S.C. § 455 because of her connection to a
funder. 61 The funded party may also incur costs if an arbitral award or
54

See, generally, A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for
our Federal Courts, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 325 (2009); Eric C. Hawkins, General
Jurisdiction and Internet Contacts: What Role, if any, Should the Zippo Sliding Scale
Test Play in the Analysis?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2371 (2006).
55
See supra note 54.
56
See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 10, passim (citing cases in Australia,
the United Kingdom, the United States, and other countries in which an arbitral
tribunal or court ordered a non-party funder to pay costs or provide security for
costs); infra note 215.
57
See generally STAVROS BREKOULAKIS, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2010).
58
See infra Part III (discussing the potential conflicts of interest that could arise
due to an undisclosed connection between a judge and a funder and the consequences
of nondisclosure).
59
Id.
60
See supra note 58.
61
See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2012) (addressing bias or prejudice of a judge); 28
U.S.C. § 455 (2012) (addressing the disqualification a judge due to a financial
conflict of interest).
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court judgment is challenged based on the appearance bias of the judge
or arbitrator because of some undisclosed connection with the funder,
even if there was no actual bias. Reinterpreting rules of litigation and
arbitration procedures to address the issue of the funder’s hidden
participation will inform the judge or arbitrator in the case that the funder
is involved.
Currently, there are only two types of dispute resolutions procedures
funded worldwide: litigation and arbitration. 62 Thus, regulating the
participation of third-party funders in the process of dispute resolution
would consist of reinterpreting or modifying the rules for both
procedures. For the reasons discussed in Part IV, rule revisions are
premature; thus, this article proposes reinterpreting rules of litigation and
arbitration procedure to address issues raised by the growing
phenomenon of third-party funding. 63 This article proposes pragmatic
reinterpretations of the existing language of specific rules regarding
discovery, disclosures, privileges, conflicts of interest, cost allocation,
sanctions, class actions, and enforcement. 64 These reinterpretations will
provide courts and arbitrators with disclosure requirements and a
framework for handling conflicts of interest and other known issues as
62 Third-party funders only fund litigation and arbitration, because funders need
a result that is enforceable in court in order to ensure that they will be able to collect
the award or legal costs—in jurisdictions with a rule that the loser pays the legal
costs—from the losing party. While a judge or arbitrator could convert a mediated
settlement agreement into a judgment or award, there is no guarantee that a judge or
arbitrator would be willing to do so or that the parties would want an enforceable
result from mediation. Furthermore, a failure of the mediation process is essentially
a financial stalemate, and the parties must still incur the cost of litigation or
arbitrating their unresolved dispute. Funders are not attracted to pure mediation
cases due to this uncertainty, even though mediation is often far cheaper than
litigation or arbitration. However, funders may fund a case involving a multi-staged
dispute resolution clause calling for mediation followed by litigation or arbitration
if the mediation is unsuccessful.
63
Why focus on the federal rules rather than state rules? State rules vary too
widely for a realistic proposal of a model state rule. In addition, state court rules
tend generally to follow trends in Federal Rules. The Federal Rules set an example
and, to that end, are quintessentially “model” state rules. Nevertheless, state laws
govern evidentiary privileges. See infra Part V.A.1 (discussing revisions to state
laws governing the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine).
64
The author examined all the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine
whether the existence of third-party funding could have an effect on the
administration of the rule. The author determined that rules relating to disclosure,
discovery, privileges, sanctions, and class actions are the only rules that could
potentially be affected by third-party funding. This article focuses on those rules
only.
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they arise. 65 If procedural problems with respect to third-party funding
become prevalent or recurrent, then rule revisions may become necessary
at that time. Meanwhile, by implementing the reinterpretations set forth
in this article, courts, judges, arbitrators, arbitral institutions, and
legislators will be able to gain a better sense of the prevalence of thirdparty funding and its effects (if any) on dispute resolution procedures.
IV. THE DEBATE: REVISE OR REINTERPRET PROCEDURAL RULES?
Although the Advisory Committee has hinted that rule revision will
likely take place in the future, there are compelling arguments against
revising the rules to address third-party funding at this time. 66 First, the
Advisory Committee has correctly stated that third-party funding “takes
many forms that may present distinctive questions” and that “the
questions raised by third-party financing are important [b]ut … have not
been fully identified, and may change as practices develop further.”67
Revising procedural rules is particularly difficult when new situations
arise, particularly this early in the existence of the third-party funding
industry.
For example, the Advisory Committee has been observing the
growing number of courts allowing or requiring electronic filing of
documents but has intentionally refrained (up to now) from revising the
Federal Rules to address electronic filing. 68 Furthermore, the Advisory
65

See infra Part V (addressing issues relating to disclosure frameworks,
privileges, sanctions, and class actions).
66
See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at 3-4.
67
Id. at 4.
68
C.f., Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules Agenda Book, (Apr. 10. 2014), 2930,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil
/CV2014-04.pdf (reflecting in the minutes of the Nov. 2013 meeting of the Advisory
Committee a discussion regarding addressing electronic filings in the Federal Rules:
“One reason for caution is the hope that courts and lawyers will be able to work
together to develop sensible solutions to problems as they arise, and that this process
will provide a better foundation for new rules than more abstract consideration. If
there are no general calls for help, no widespread complaints that the rules need to
be brought into the present and near future, perhaps there is no need to rush ahead
on a broad basis…. A committee member suggested that it is worthwhile to look at
these questions more thoughtfully, but not immediately. ‘There are issues out there,
but they are not yet big issues. Time will bring more information.’ We should do the
obvious things now, and find out whether lawyers are complaining about other
things. A broader view noted that this discussion reflects a regular pattern in
rulemaking. We often confront a choice. We could attempt to anticipate the future
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Committee observed and assessed discovery disputes regarding
electronically stored information (ESI) for several years under the current
rules modified by local case law and local rules before proposing the
current amendments to address e-discovery. 69 The amendments to the
rules were intended to address directly problems with ESI that had arisen
in the courts. 70 Thus, it is likely that the Advisory Committee plans to
wait to see how judges and arbitrators handle third-party funding before
revising the Federal Rules.
Similarly, arbitral institutions worldwide have refrained from
revising their rules to address third-party funding in order to maintain the
trans-substantivity of arbitration rules and avoid clashing with the
applicable national laws regarding third-party funding chosen by the
parties or the laws of the procedural seat of arbitration. 71 The
International Bar Association (IBA) is the only organization that has
revised any arbitration-related rules to address third-party funding. 72 The
IBA Guidelines are optional rather than mandatory, however, so the
systemic impact of their revisions remains uncertain. In essence, the

and provide for it. Or we can wait and codify what the world has come to do, at least
generally. ‘We do want to reflect what people are doing. But perhaps not just yet.’
States ‘may get ahead of us.’ And we can learn from them.”)
69
See id. at 369-535 (detailing the history and arguments regarding Proposed
Rule 37(e), which addresses evidentiary sanctions for electronically stored
information).
70
See id.
71
Arbitration is supposed to transcend substantive laws, but also be compatible
with those laws. Parties can choose arbitration and whatever substantive laws they
prefer. In this way, arbitration is trans-substantive. Some countries or states prohibit
third-party funding while others allow it. The arbitral institutions cannot adopt
arbitration rules that conflict with either of those positions. Therefore, the arbitration
institutions will likely remain neutral and not address third-party funding in their
arbitration rules. Hence, for arbitration, there is no uniform way to address thirdparty funding. There are dozens of arbitration rules in use worldwide, and parties
can even fashion their own arbitration procedure by agreement, if they prefer. The
arbitration institutions will likely not change their arbitration rules to address thirdparty funding, because it would be too difficult to come to a consensus about what
the new rule should be. Thus, the best vehicle to address third-party funding in
arbitration is through guidelines or codes of best practices. See Jim Saksa, Victoria
Shannon Discusses The State of the Legal Funding Industry at Home and in
International Arbitration, LEGAL FUNDING CENTRAL – LFC360 BLOG (Jul. 31,
http://legalfundingcentral.com/lfc360/new/legal-funding-expert-victoria2014),
shannon-discusses-state-industry-home-international-arbitration/ (last visited Feb.
15, 2015). Cf. infra note 257 regarding the debate over the trans-substantive nature
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
72
See infra note 89.
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third-party funding industry is nascent and understudied in the United
States and many other jurisdictions around the world, so rule revisions
undertaken now would like not be well-informed.
Second, amending the Federal Rules73 and amending rules of
arbitration 74 are both complex, lengthy processes. As history indicates,
revising even one rule in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or rules of
arbitration may take years. 75 Most rules of arbitration are revised only
once or twice within a decade, and the major arbitral institutions have
adopted revisions to their rules recently enough for additional revisions
to be many years away. 76
Observing the effects of third-party funding in the litigation and
arbitration systems would be ideal before proposing rule revisions;
however, under the current rules, courts and arbitrators are not informed
when third-party funding is involved in a case. As discussed in Part V,
judges and arbitrators can interpret the existing the rules to mandate
disclosure to the decision maker to ensure that decision makers are aware
of the funder's involvement in cases they are hearing. Judges and
arbitrators can then observe the case and develop a sense of what is
working or not working about the funder’s participation and observe how
smoothly, efficiently, and fairly the case progresses to a resolution. If
there are problems, judges can report this information to their districts’
delegates to the Judicial Conference of the United States, established
under 28 U.S.C. § 331, so that the Conference might consider future rule
73
For an overview of the rules revision process, see 28 U.S.C. § 2074-75;
Overview
for
the
Bench
Bar
and
Public,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking/howrulemaking-process-works/overview-bench-bar-public.aspx (explaining the entire
rules revision process in detail); GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, VOL. 1, § 440,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/aboutavailable
at
rulemaking/laws-procedures-governing-work-rules/rules-committeeprocedures.aspx (explaining the process of rule revision in the Standing Committee
in
detail);
About
the
Rulemaking
Process,
,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking.aspx; Pending
Rules Amendments http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/pendingrules.aspx (describing the procedures for revising the Federal Rules).
74
See, e.g., Jason Fry & Victoria Shannon, The 2012 ICC Rules of Arbitration in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE
FORDHAM PAPERS 2011, 187-201 (Arthur Rovine ed., 2012) (describing the
complex process for revising the ICC Rules of Arbitration).
75
See supra note 73; Fry & Shannon, supra note 74.
76
For example, six of the most widely used sets of arbitration rules in the world
were revised within the past five years: two were revised in 2014, two in 2013, one
in 2012, and one in 2010. Cf. infra notes 148 and 184 citing provisions from those
six sets of arbitration rules.
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revisions to address such problems. 77 Arbitrators can report this
information to the arbitral institution overseeing their cases. 78 This
reporting will help educate those undertaking the lengthy rules revision
processes long before amendments would actually be proposed.
Third, the Federal Rules authorize "construing" the Federal Rules
and creating local court rules and judicially-created rules when needed,
which may be sufficient to address issues relating to third-party
funding. 79 Rule 1 provides that the rules “should be construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding,” and a proposed revision to Rule 1 would
put the same duty on the parties to each case. 80 Arbitration rules contain
77
See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (describing the function of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, which includes “mak[ing] a comprehensive survey of the
condition of business in the courts,” “submit[ting] suggestions and
recommendations to the various courts to promote uniformity of management
procedures and the expeditious conduct of court business,” “carry[ing] on a
continuous study of the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and
procedure now or hereafter in use as prescribed by the Supreme Court for the other
courts of the United States pursuant to law,” and “recommend[ing] [rule changes]
from time to time to the Supreme Court for its consideration and adoption,
modification or rejection, in accordance with law.”)
78
In the case of ad hoc arbitration, the arbitrator would report to the appointing
authority, if there is one involved. If there is no appointing authority, then that
particular arbitrator would likely not have a duty to report the involvement of the
third-party funder to any outside entity. The arbitrator would have to report to the
parties in the ad hoc arbitration if the arbitrator has a conflict of interest with respect
to the third-party funder’s participation.
79
See infra notes 80 and 82.
80
Note that a pending proposed revision to Rule 1 would add a duty on the parties
to employ the rules in a cooperative manner. See Advisory Committee on the Civil
Rules Agenda Book, supra note 68, at 92-93 (“The published proposal amends Rule
1 to direct that the rules ‘be construed, and administered, and employed by the court
and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.’ … Cooperation among the parties was a theme heavily and
frequently emphasized at the Duke Conference. It has been vigorously urged, and
principles of cooperation have been drafted by concerned organizations. There is
little opposition to the basic concept of cooperation…. A more specific question,
largely ignored in the comments, asks whether the parties should be directed to
construe and administer the rules, as well as to employ them, to the desired ends.
The rule could be written: “construed and administered by the court, and employed
by the parties, to secure * * *.” But on balance it seems better to retain the hint that
the parties should undertake to construe the rules for their intended purposes, and —
to the extent that the parties commonly administer the rules, as in discovery — to
administer them for the same purposes.”) (cross out, underlining, and asterisks in
original).
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a similar provision. 81 Rule 83 authorizes the creation of new procedural
rules at the grassroots level on an ad hoc basis to address new situations
and needs. 82 For example, Rule 83(a) provides that district courts can
make their own local rules if there is no preexisting federal rule on the
subject, and Rule 83(b) states that “a judge may regulate practice in any
manner consistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. § 2072
[rules made by the U.S. Supreme Court], and § 2075 [bankruptcy rules],
and the district’s local rules.” 83 Thus, the Federal Rules already provide
district courts and judges with the authority to construe and apply the
existing Federal Rules, or to create new local rules, to take into account
third-party funding.
Some perceptive judges have occasionally asked parties outright
when they suspect that a funder is involved in the case. 84 The
disadvantage of this approach is that there could be conflicting judicial
practices or local court rules regarding third-party funding in various
jurisdictions, which would lead to confusion regarding how third-party
funding is or should be handled by federal courts. As of now, there is
insufficient data on the prevalence of third-party funding in U.S. litigation
to determine whether conflicting rules among federal districts would
actually create a problem. Standardizing regulation has costs as well as
benefits, so standardization should be employed only if necessary to solve
a particular problem. In arbitration, arbitrators have somewhat more
flexible procedural standards and can devise procedures and rules tailored
to the parties’ needs, but they must also be notified of the funder’s
participation in order to disclose potential conflicts of interest, if any. 85
Fourth, more instances of both effective and problematic funding
need to be observed in the courts and arbitrations over a longer period
before comprehensive rule revision proposals can be formulated. At
present, potentially problematic funding arrangements are revealed in
court or in an arbitration only when the funding agreement is disputed or
challenged.86
Satisfied parties and funders proceed with their
arrangements silently under our current rules, so there is no mechanism

81

See, e.g., infra note 250.
See FED. R. CIV P. 83 (authorizing district courts “to adopt and amend rules
governing its practice” provided that “[a] local rule must be consistent with—but not
duplicate—federal statutes and rules” and authorizing that “[a] judge may regulate
practice in any manner consistent with federal law, [the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the bankruptcy rules], and the district’s local rules….”).
83
See supra note 82.
84
See, e.g., infra note 215.
85
See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
86
See, e.g., supra note 35; infra note 215.
82
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for observing best practices to determine the appropriate behavior as the
basis for formulating new or revised rules. Thus, formulating rules or
revisions at this stage may be reactionary and would likely be based
largely on addressing observed problems that may be outliers, rather than
encouraging good behavior. 87 Without judges and arbitrators requiring
disclosure of funding arrangements to the decision maker, however,
courts and arbitral tribunals will not have the tools needed to identify and
observe cases involving third-party funding to see whether the observed
problems are widespread or isolated.
Fifth, writing an effective Federal Rule or rule of arbitration likely
requires coming up with a definition of “third-party funding” or “thirdparty funder,” which has proved to be incredibly difficult. 88 An example
of a recent attempt to define “third-party funder” can be found in the
revised International Bar Association’s Guidelines on Conflicts of
Interest in International Arbitration, addressing arbitrator conflicts of
interest. 89 The explanation to one of the Guidelines states that a thirdparty funder “may have a direct economic interest in the award…” and
would be “any person or entity that is contributing funds, or other
material support, to the prosecution or defence [sic] of the case and that
has a direct economic interest in, or a duty to indemnify a party for, the
award to be rendered in the arbitration.” 90 This definition was coined in
the context of international arbitration, but it is relevant to litigation as
well.
87

Cf. Northern Securities Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called
great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but
because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the
feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of
hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and
before which even well settled principles of law will bend.”); Winterbottom v.
Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng.Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842) (“This is one of those
unfortunate cases … in which, it is, no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be
without a remedy, but by that consideration we ought not to be influenced. Hard
cases, it has frequently been observed, are apt to introduce bad law.”).
88
See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
89
See International Bar Association, Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in
International Arbitration, (Nov. 28, 2014) (including references to third-party
funding as a “direct economic interest in the award to be rendered in the arbitration”
in General Standards 6 and 7; the Explanations to General Standards 6 and 7; the
Non-Waivable Red List § 1.2; the Waivable Red List § 2.2.3; the Orange List §§
3.2.2,
3.4.3,
and
3.4.4)
available
at
http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.
aspx [hereinafter “IBA Guidelines”].
90
Id. at Explanation to General Standard 6.
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On the contrary, a definition of “third-party funding” or “third-party
funder” may not be required in order to write an effective rule to address
this phenomenon. For example, the U.S. constitutional "obscenity” test
could be said to take a “know it when you see it” approach, which is likely
appropriate for third-party funding as well. 91 Such a test would be easy
to apply, because parties know when they are funded and funders know
when they are funding, regardless of the structure of the arrangement.
Thus, the rules could direct parties to disclose the existence of their
funding arrangement without having to define “third-party funding” or
“third-party funder” in the rules. For example, Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv)
already requires disclosure of the defendant’s insurance arrangement
where the insurer is potentially liable for paying for the judgment. 92 Yet,
the Federal Rules do not define the word “insurance,” rightfully
presuming that defendants know whether they are insured. 93 Similarly,
Rule 26(b)(3)(A) limits disclosure of trial preparation documents and
protects documents prepared by other representatives or entities assisting
a party such as a “consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent”
without defining any of those terms. 94 This approach has proved
successful. Thus, effective rules revisions may not require defining
"third-party funder" or "third-party funding.” However, this question
need not be answered definitively at this time, since rule revisions will
not take place in the near future.
On balance, the Advisory Committee and arbitral institutions are
probably correct to refrain from changing procedural rules while thirdparty funding is still growing and developing. It is better for judges and
arbitrators to use their inherent powers to deal with the practice on an ad
hoc basis unless or until systematic problems give rise to a need to address
third-party funding directly in the procedural rules. 95
91

See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 39 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“But even those members of this Court who had created the new and changing
standards of ‘obscenity’ could not agree on their application. And so we adopted a
per curiam treatment of so-called obscene publications that seemed to pass
constitutional muster under the several constitutional tests which had been
formulated. Some condemn it if its ‘dominant tendency might be to “deprave or
corrupt” a reader.’ Others look not to the content of the book but to whether it is
advertised ‘to appeal to the erotic interests of customers.’ Some condemn only
‘hardcore pornography’; but even then a true definition is lacking. It has indeed been
said of that definition, ‘I could never succeed in (defining it) intelligibly,’ but ‘I
know it when I see it.’”) (internal footnotes and citations omitted).
92
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv).
93
Id.
94
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A).
95
See supra note 71.
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V. THE SOLUTION: PROPOSED RULE REINTERPRETATIONS IN LIGHT
OF THIRD-PARTY FUNDING
This Part answers the call of the Advisory Committee to give
guidance to judges regarding how to interpret and administer the Federal
Rules of Civil procedure when they encounter third-party funding in a
case. 96 This Part also incorporates guidance to arbitrators regarding how
to handle third-party funding, since, as mentioned earlier, rules of
arbitration procedure will likely not be revised any time soon either. 97
This Part addresses litigation and arbitration together for several
reasons. First, at its foundation, arbitration is a quasi-judicial process;
rules of litigation have informed the development and interpretation of
rules of arbitration worldwide. 98 Second, arbitration relies on courts to
perform many essential procedural functions either that arbitrators do not
have the power to perform or that the parties choose to have the court
perform instead, such as issuing subpoenas, attaching assets, issuing
injunctions, enforcing an arbitration agreement, and recognizing or
enforcing arbitral awards. 99 Thus, the two processes are never
completely separate and dovetail at the enforcement stage, as discussed
in Part V.D. Third, arbitration borrows privilege rules from litigation

96

See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
98
See e.g., Eric E. Bergsten, Module 5.1: International Commercial Arbitration:
Overview, in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
COURSE ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY,
19
(2005),
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add38_en.pdf (“Most societies developed at
an early date systems [sic] of ‘arbitration’ for the settlement of disputes. Disputes
between private parties that are settled by arbitration might be of a family nature,
concern labor relations or be between two commercial enterprises. In the past such
disputes were almost exclusively domestic and the systems of arbitration that
developed reflected the nature of the particular society. It is no surprise, therefore,
to find vast differences between domestic arbitration in Continental Europe, Latin
America, Islamic countries, the United States and China. In some countries,
particularly in Latin America and in England, arbitration was traditionally seen as
an extension of the State system of litigation. In such an atmosphere the procedure
followed in arbitration was necessarily closely modelled on the procedure followed
in litigation in the courts. Even where arbitration was not seen as an extension of the
State system of litigation, and the law did not require the local court procedure to be
followed in arbitration, the habits developed by lawyers in the courts were carried
over into arbitration.”).
99
See Shannon (2015), supra note 29, at 126-27 (describing the various essential
functions that courts perform with respect to arbitration proceedings).
97
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rules either from the seat of arbitration or chosen by the parties; there are
no separate privilege rules for arbitration. 100 Fourth, both judges and
arbitrators need disclosure from the funded party in order to carry out
their duties with respect to handling conflicts of interests as they relate to
third-party funding. 101 Fifth, many procedural devices that may be
affected by third-party funding are used in both litigation and arbitration,
such as class actions, cost sanctions, and attorney fee shifting. 102 Finally,
courts enforce both judgments and arbitration awards; arbitrators and
arbitral institutions have no power to enforce the awards they issue.103
For the foregoing reasons, this Part provides a pragmatic set of
reinterpretations of the existing rules of litigation and arbitration
procedure regarding discovery, disclosures, privileges, conflicts of
interest, cost allocation, sanctions, class actions, and enforcement in light
of the third-party funding phenomenon.
A. Judging Discovery, Disclosures, and Privileges
1. Litigation: Initial Disclosures, Pretrial Conferences, and Evidentiary
Privileges
The overarching theme of all calls to regulate third-party funding is
disclosure. However, many more questions are raised by the call to
disclose than are answered. When must information be disclosed? To
whom must this information be disclosed: the decision maker or the
opposing side? What information should be disclosed: the identity of the
funder, a summary of the terms of the funding agreement, or the actual
text of the agreement? Should evidentiary privileges extend to privileged
information that parties disclose to funders or to work product created
by funders? This Section attempts to answer these questions by
reinterpreting Rule 26, Rule 16, and privileges under U.S. common law.
The purpose of Rule 26 is to guide the parties through the process of
100

See generally Klaus Peter Berger, Evidentiary Privileges: Best Practice
Standards versus/ and Arbitral Discretion, 22 ARB. INT’L 501 (2006); Richard M.
Mosk & Tom Ginsburg, Evidentiary Privileges in International Arbitration, 50
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 345 (2001); Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”:
Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289 (1998). See also infra Part V.A.
101
See infra Part V.B.
102
See infra Part V.C.
103
See infra note 242 and accompanying text; see also infra Part V.D regarding
the enforcement of arbitral awards.
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discovery and disclosure. 104 Rule 26(f) also instructs the parties to agree
on a discovery plan during a pretrial conference separate from the
conference required by Rule 16, although both conferences together may
result in a joint plan for discovery and scheduling. 105 Rule 26(b)(1) limits
discovery to any "nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's
claim or defense." 106 Rule 26 does not define the term "relevant," but the
Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 amendments to Rule 26 state that
the focus of discovery should be the actual claims and defenses in the
action, and that discovery should not be used to develop new claims or
defenses not already pled. 107 In light of this, the existence or terms of the
funding arrangement would not be relevant or material to any of the pled
claims and defenses relating to the merits of the case. 108 Funders are also
not witnesses or experts subject to disclosure, as they will not testify at
trial and are not employed as experts by the parties. 109 Thus, third-party
funding ordinarily would not be subject to general discovery or initial
disclosure under Rule 26. 110
A potential exception is found in Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv), which
requires a party in discovery to disclose any insurance agreement where
the insurer is potentially liable for paying for or reimbursing the insured
party for all or part of the judgment. 111 A court will likely view a funder
that agrees to pay the underlying judgment (not just costs and attorneys’
fees) as an insurer, which would subject the funding arrangement to this
Rule. 112 This rule already applies to funding arrangements that cover the
underlying the liability, without the need for revisions. However, in the

104

See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
See FED R. CIV. P. 26(f); see supra note 139 (regarding the FED R. CIV. P. 16
pretrial conference).
106
See FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). A proposed revision to FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)
would include a proportionality element, but would not change the effect on thirdparty funding because the phrase “the parties’ resources” would remain in the rule.
See Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules Agenda Book, supra note 68, at 79-93,
(discussing proposed revisions to Rule 26), 97-105 (presenting actual markup of
revisions to Rule 26).
107
See 2000 Advisory Committee Note to FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
108
This is separate from the party disclosing this identity of the funder to the
judge, in camera, under the proposed revisions to FED R. CIV. P. 7.1 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 455. See infra Part V.B.1.
109
See FED R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3)(A) (regarding witnesses that must be disclosed)
and FED R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2) (regarding experts that must be disclosed).
110
See Advisory Committee Note to FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (stating that the
parties cannot use discovery to develop new claims or defenses).
111
See FED R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv).
112
Id.
105
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vast majority of funding arrangements, the funder does not agree to pay
the underlying liability. Thus, this rule is inapplicable to the vast majority
of third-party funding arrangements.
Similarly, while the funding arrangement need not be disclosed or
discoverable, the participation of a funder may be relevant to a court
assessing "the parties' resources" when determining whether to limit the
frequency and extent of discovery. 113 A judge could require the funded
party to disclose the identity of the funder to the judge by reinterpreting
Rule 7.1 or through implementing a local rule requiring such disclosure
under Rule 83, so that the judge would know that the funder is
participating. 114 The participation of the funder may indicate that the
party has more "resources" for litigation costs – including discovery –
than its personal financial status may suggest. Alternatively, if the term
"resources" is not construed to include sources of third-party funding,
then Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) should be construed to include third-party
funding. 115
The portion of the Advisory Committee’s report quoted in the
introduction explained that the Advisory Committee declined to pursue
further a formal proposal to amend Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) to require
disclosure of third-party funding arrangements to the opposing party for
inspection and copying. 116 Fed. R. Civ P. 26(a)(1)(A) governs initial
disclosures that parties must make to one another at the outset of their
dispute. 117 The amendment does not align with purpose and goals of Rule
26 and may lead to satellite litigation. 118 The first three required initial
113

See FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii); cf. Letter from the U.S. Chamber Institute
for Legal Reform et al., to the Secretary of the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, RE: Proposed Amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A), (Apr. 9, 2014),
at 4-5, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/cvsuggestions-2014/14-CV-B-suggestion.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) [hereinafter
Letter] (discussing the potential for cost-shifting for “complex discovery disputes”
if a third-party funder is involved).
114
See supra note 82 and accompanying text; infra Part V.B.1.
115
For example, FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) could be revised to say “the
parties’ resources (including third-party funding).”
116
See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also Letter, supra note 113, at 8.
117
See generally FED. R. CIV P. 26(a)(1)(A) (outlining initial required disclosures
that parties must make).
118
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1), Committee Notes (2000 Amendments)
(“Purposes of amendments. The Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosure provisions are
amended to establish a nationally uniform practice. The scope of the disclosure
obligation is narrowed to cover only information that the disclosing party may use
to support its position. In addition, the rule exempts specified categories of
proceedings from initial disclosure, and permits a party who contends that disclosure
is not appropriate in the circumstances of the case to present its objections to the
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disclosures listed under the existing rule all relate to witnesses or
evidence that will be presented at trial, and the fourth required initial
disclosure addresses insurance agreements that may be used to satisfy,
indemnify, or reimburse all or part of the monetary judgment. 119 The
funding agreement does not relate to witnesses or evidence that will be
presented at trial, and the vast majority of non-party litigation funders do
not agree to pay the underlying judgment. 120 In addition, as mentioned
above, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), the terms of the funding
arrangement are not "relevant to any party's claim or defense," nor would
disclosure of the terms of the funding agreement "lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence." 121 Thus, this proposed amendment falls outside
the purpose and goals of Rule 26, as a whole. 122 Furthermore, such an
amendment would likely lead to satellite litigation over the terms of the
funding arrangement or to the parties comparing and contrasting the
terms of their funding arrangements, if both sides are funded in the
court, which must then determine whether disclosure should be made.”) (emphasis
added); infra note 123 (listing sources discussing the dangers of satellite litigation
over the funding arrangement).
119
See FED. R. CIV P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i) (requiring disclosure of “the name …,
address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable
information … that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or
defenses…”); FED. R. CIV P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring disclosure of “a copy … of
all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the
disclosing party … may use to support its claims or defenses...”); FED. R. CIV P.
26(a)(1)(A)(iii) (“a computation of each category of damages claimed by the
disclosing party” and “the documents or other evidentiary material … on which each
computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries
suffered”); FED. R. CIV P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) (requiring disclosure of “any insurance
agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or party of
a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made
to satisfy the judgment.”).
120
If the funder has purchased an assignment of the claim or liability, then the
funder has agreed to pay the underlying judgment (if any) and would be named as a
party to the case. Most funders are not parties, however, and do not agree to pay the
underlying judgment, even on the defense side. See Steinitz, infra note 9, at 12751276 (2011); NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 1052, at 5-6. This is different
from a liability insurance arrangement in which the insurer does agree to pay the
judgment. If a third-party funder does agree to pay the underlying judgment, then
that arrangement would be subject to disclosure under the existing FED. R. CIV P.
26(a)(1)(A)(iv).
121
See FED. R. CIV P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense…. Relevant
information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”).
122
See supra note 118.
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case. 123 In sum, the proposed amendment was not the right solution and
may distract the parties from pursuing the merits of their underlying
dispute. Nevertheless, the authors of the letter have identified an
important problem, namely that the decision maker needs to know about
the participation of the third-party funder in the case, which is addressed
in Part V.B, below.
Rule 26 also addresses privileges, which are another source of
uncertainty in the rules of procedure with respect to third-party funding.
The main privileges that would protect a party's documents and
information in federal court would be the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine.124 Both privileges are subject to wavier by
disclosure of the document or information to a third party, unless an
exception to waiver applies. 125 The exceptions to waiver listed Federal
123

See,
e.g.,
William
Akel
et.
al.,
Litigation
funding,
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a08905f5-f923-4fc8-ba98dc9bdf8efe23 (Oct. 12., 2014) (“Strategically minded defendants are also interested
in knowing about the plaintiffs’ funding arrangements, so as to be able to undermine
them and potentially defeat even meritorious claims through satellite litigation.”);
Law Council of Australia, Regulation of third party litigation funding in Australia:
Position Paper, 3, http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/lawcouncil/images/LCA-PDF/a-zdocs/RegulationofthirdpartylitigationfundinginAustralia.pdf (Jun. 2011) (“The
purpose of the paper was to set out areas in which regulation may be required for
consumer protection, to minimise [sic] conflicts of interest and put an end to
expensive satellite litigation over the propriety of litigation funding agreements.”);
Atherton
Godfrey
Solicitors,
Satellite
Litigation,
http://www.athertongodfrey.co.uk/satellite-litigation (“Satellite litigation can take
up more than an ‘appropriate share of the Court’s resources’, tends not to help with
either expedition or the saving of expense and perhaps more than anything leads to
disproportionality. Recent years have seen many of the issues arising from the last
significant procedural and funding reforms gradually resolved, though not without
much satellite litigation on the way. It would be regrettable if further proposed
changes lead to a similar period of uncertainty, cost and delay.”).
124
See FED R. EVID. 502(g) (defining “attorney-client privilege” and “workproduct protection”). Other privileges – such as the doctor-patient, priest-penitent,
and accountant-client privileges – would not apply to third-party funding. Also, note
that FED R. EVID. 502 applies in diversity cases and in state courts. See FED R. EVID.
502(f).
125
See FED R. EVID. 502 (stating that the exceptions to waiver of the attorneyclient privilege and the work-product doctrine are: disclosure in a separate federal
proceeding [502(a)], disclosure to a federal office or agency [502(a)], inadvertent
disclosure [502(b)], disclosure in a separate state proceeding [502(c)], a court order
stating that the privilege is not waived [502(d)]; an agreement among the parties
stating that the effect of disclosure is not waiver of the privilege [502(e)]). Also,
note that FED R. EVID. 502 applies in diversity cases and in state courts. See FED R.
EVID. 502(f).
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Rule of Evidence 502 generally do not apply to third-party funding. 126
In order to determine whether to fund a case, funders may require
parties to share information about their case that may be privileged under
applicable law. 127 There is currently no rule including the funder within
the exceptions to waiver; thus, a party's privileged documents or
information may become discoverable by the opposing party after the
funded party discloses such documents or information to the funder.128
At least one federal district court has stated that a preexisting
confidentiality agreement between the funder and the funded party may
protect the disclosed information under the work-product doctrine, but
not the attorney-client privilege. 129 In the absence of a clear rule,
however, parties may be wary about seeking funding for fear that they
will waive their privileges by sharing information with the funder.
The attorney-client privilege derives from sources other than the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 130 Thus, state legislatures or state
supreme courts would have to amend the exceptions to waiver of the
common law attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine to
extend to disclosures made to the funder. This solution would increase
the security of confidential information that the party must share with the
funder in order to obtain funding and prevent penalizing a party seeking
funding by protecting against the potential waiver of its evidentiary
privileges. In the interim, under Rules 16 and 26(f), parties can discuss
and make an agreement regarding the applicability of evidentiary
privileges to information disclosed to the funder. 131 The parties should
also strongly consider asking the judge to memorialize their agreement in
a court order. 132
Although the privileges and protections for the funded party's
documents and information are presently unclear, Rule 26 already
protects documents and information prepared by the funder. 133 Rule
126

Id.
See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 1052, at 4-11.
128
See infra note 129.
129
See generally Miller UK Ltd. and Miller International Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
17 F.Supp.3d 711 (N.D.Il. 2014), (addressing attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine in the context of a party seeking third-party funding).
130
See FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that federal common law governs privileges in
federal court, unless the Constitution, a federal statute or the Supreme Court
provides otherwise; in diversity cases, “for which state law supplies the rule of
decision,” state law governs privileges in federal court; Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not govern privileges in those cases).
131
See FED R. CIV. P. 16; FED R. CIV. P. 26(f).
132
See FED R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(D).
133
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
127
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26(b)(3)(A) prohibits discovery of “documents and tangible things that
are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party
or its representatives,” except in exigent circumstances. 134 Furthermore,
the rule states that the term "representatives" includes a “consultant,
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent.” 135 A funder surely falls within one
or more of these categories.
Rule 26(b)(3)(B) protects the
representatives’ “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories.” 136 Thus, the funder's documents and information with respect
to a potential or current funded party would be already protected under
the existing rule. 137 The existing protections for the funder's trial
preparation materials also bolster the idea that the exceptions to waiver
of the common law attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine
should be amended to extend to disclosures made to the funder.
Despite the unclear status of evidentiary privileges for documents
disclosed to funders, the parties can make an enforceable agreement
during their pretrial conference regarding how such information will be
handled in their case. 138 Rule 16 gives the court the authority to order the
parties to hold a pre-trial conference to work out many issues, including
disclosures, scheduling, and other issues before trial. 139 Many local court
rules explicitly require the parties to participate in this pretrial
conference. Rule 16 further stipulates, among other things, that parties
may make an agreement to modify the extent of discovery, 140 honor
claims of privilege over documents or protection over trial preparation
materials, 141 and handle "other appropriate matters" as they agree. 142 In
addition, courts may "consider and take action" on "facilitating in other
ways the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action."143
Courts may also impose sanctions under Rule 16(f)(1)(C) against a party
or a party's attorney (but not a funder) for "fail[ure] to obey a scheduling
or other pretrial order.” This is reasonable, because the funder does not
appear or present documents or testimony in the case.
Under the existing Rule 16, the parties can make an agreement
regarding how the disclosure of the funding arrangement will be handled
134

See FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A).
Id.
136
See FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B).
137
See supra note 129 and 133.
138
See FED R. CIV. P. 16; See FED R. CIV. P. 26.
139
See FED R. CIV. P. 16(a) (“the court may order the attorneys and any
unrepresented parties to appear for one or more pretrial conferences”).
140
See FED R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii).
141
See FED R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv).
142
See FED R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(vi).
143
See FED R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(P).
135

Shannon – Judging Third-Party Funding

30

3/17/2015 12:17 AM

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

and whether documents shared with or prepared by funders would be
protected under the attorney-client privileges and the work product
doctrine. 144 Such an agreement may be memorialized in a discovery plan
under Rule 26(f)(3). 145 The parties are most likely willing to make such
an agreement when funders back both sides. If the agreement is
memorialized in a scheduling order, then the party or the party's attorney
could be sanctioned by the court for noncompliance. 146 While the
existing wording of Rule 16 provides a catch-all that would cover thirdparty funding, 147 it would be clearer to add language referencing funding
to list under Rule 16(b)(3)(B) ("permitted contents of a scheduling
order") and the list under Rule 16(c)(2) ("matters for consideration at a
pretrial conference"). Even without rule revisions, the existing language
of Rule 16, in combination with local court rules, will suffice. If the
parties make no agreement under Rule 16 regarding the treatment of
documents disclosed to and prepared by the funder, then the default
position for federal courts regarding those documents should be that they
are privileged in the absence of an express waiver by the funded party.
2. Arbitration: Evidentiary Disclosures and Privileges
Currently no rules of arbitration require disclosure of the
participation of a third-party funder to the opposing party as a matter of
general evidentiary disclosure. The arbitrators, in consultation with the
parties and in compliance with the arbitration clause, govern all rules of
evidentiary disclosure and privileges in each individual arbitration
proceeding. 148 The arbitrators determine on a case-by-case basis whether
144

See Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules Agenda Book, supra note 68, at 91
(discussing additions to Rule 16(b)(3): “The proposal also adds two subjects to the
list of contents permitted in a scheduling order: the preservation of ESI, and
agreements reached under Evidence Rule 502. Parallel provisions are added to the
subjects for discussion at the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference.”); 96-97 (presenting the
markup of the revisions to Rule 16 and the Committee Notes, which state “The
[scheduling] order also may include agreements incorporated in a court order under
Evidence Rule 502 controlling the effects of disclosure of information covered by
attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, a topic also added to the
provisions of a discovery plan under Rule 26(f)(3)(D).”).
145
See supra note 144.
146
See FED R. CIV. P. 16(f)(1)(C).
147
See supra note 142.
148
See, e.g., London Court of International Arbitration, LCIA Arbitration Rules,
Art. 22.1(vi) (2014), http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lciaarbitration-rules-2014.aspx [hereinafter LCIA Rules] (tribunal has the authority “to
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privileged information disclosed to a third-party funder is admissible and
whether the disclosure waived any applicable evidentiary privileges. 149
Creating an arbitration rule regarding the effect of third-party funding on
the waiver of evidentiary privileges would infringe on the parties’ right
to choose an evidentiary regime in which disclosure to a third-party
funder either waives or does not waive an applicable evidentiary
privilege. Thus, creating such a rule would be unwise and may even
violate the parties’ freedom to choose – if they wish to do so – the
evidentiary rules that will apply to their arbitration proceedings.

decide whether or not to apply any strict rules of evidence (or any other rules) as to
the admissibility, relevance or weight of any material tendered by a party on any
issue of fact or expert opinion; and to decide the time, manner and form in which
such material should be exchanged between the parties and presented to the Arbitral
Tribunal”); International Centre for Dispute Resolution, International Dispute
Resolution
Procedures,
Art.
20(6)
(2014),
https://www.icdr.org/icdr/faces/i_search/i_rule/i_rule_detail?_afrWindowId=exo0
mv9ra_68&_afrLoop=1768552008878792&doc=ADRSTAGE2025301&_afrWind
owMode=0&_adf.ctrl-state=exo0mv9ra_71 [hereinafter ICDR Rules] (“The
tribunal shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of the
evidence.”); ICDR Rules, Art. 22 (“The arbitral tribunal shall take into account
applicable principles of privilege, such as those involving the confidentiality of
communications between a lawyer and client. When the parties, their counsel, or
their documents would be subject under applicable law to different rules, the tribunal
should, to the extent possible, apply the same rule to all parties, giving preference to
the rule that provides the highest level of protection.”); Hong Kong International
Arbitration Centre, Administered Arbitration Rules, Art. 22.2 (2013),
http://www.hkiac.org/en/arbitration/arbitration-rules-guidelines/hkiacadministered-arbitration-rules-2013 [hereinafter HKIAC Rules] (“The arbitral
tribunal shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the
evidence, including whether to apply strict rules of evidence.”); Singapore
International Arbitration Centre, Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International
Arbitration Centre, Art. 16.2 (2013), http://www.siac.org.sg/our-rules/rules/siacrules-2013 [hereinafter SIAC Rules] (“The Tribunal shall determine the relevance,
materiality and admissibility of all evidence. Evidence need not be admissible in
law.”); SIAC Rules, Art. 24(p) (arbitral tribunal has the power to “determine any
claim of legal or other privilege”); Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber
of
Commerce,
2010
Arbitration
Rules,
Art.
26(1)
(2010),
http://www.sccinstitute.com/media/40120/arbitrationrules_eng_webbversion.pdf
[hereinafter SCC Rules] (“The admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of
evidence shall be for the Arbitral Tribunal to determine.”); SCC Rules, Art. 26(3)
(tribunal may order the production of evidence relevant to the outcome of the case,
which would usually not be the third-party funding agreement).
149
See supra note 148.
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B. Judging Conflicts of Interest of the Decision Maker
1. Litigation: Corporate Party Disclosure Statements to Judges
In order for a judge to check for financial conflicts of interest, the
parties must disclose to the judge their relevant corporate relationships. 150
Rule 7.1 requires that corporate parties make disclosures regarding their
corporate ownership in order to assist judges in determining whether they
may have a potential conflict of interest mandating disqualification under
28 U.S.C. § 455 and the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.151
Rule 7.1 was modeled after Appellate Procedure Rule 26.1. 152 The
purpose of both rules is to provide financial disclosures to facilitate
judicial recusal decisions in circumstances where automatic financial
interest disqualification is required under 28 U.S.C. § 455. 153
The influence of third-party funders raises similar concerns as
corporate influence, as both types of non-party entities may attempt to
exert similar amounts of control over the proceedings. Therefore, the
purpose of the disclosure statement applies to third-party funders,
especially funders organized as corporations. The timing of the corporate
disclosure – at the party's first contact with the court, in person or in
writing – is the appropriate timing for disclosing the identity of the thirdparty funder as well. 154 In addition, parties must "promptly" file a
supplemental disclosure if circumstances change, which would be
appropriate in the context of a third-party funder beginning to fund a
pending case or withdrawing from funding a case. 155 Furthermore, courts
have applied wide-ranging sanctions when a party persistently does not
file the disclosure statement, even after the court has directly requested
the party to file the disclosure. 156 The threat of sanctions ensures that
150

See FED. R. APP. P. 26.1, Advisory Committee Notes (1989 addition); 28
U.S.C. § 455; Code of Conduct for United States Judges at Canon 3C(1)(c).
151
Id.
152
FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1, Advisory Committee Notes (2002 Adoption).
153
Id.
154
See FED R. CIV. P. 7.1(b)(1) (“[must] file the disclosure statement with its first
appearance, pleading, petition, motion, response or other request addressed to the
court”).
155
See FED R. CIV. P. 7.1(b)(2) (“[must] promptly file a supplemental statement
if any required information changes.”).
156
See, e.g., American Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Lawson Bros. Trucking Co., 2008 WL
4899425, at *1 (S.D.Ill. 2008) (holding attorney-of-record in contempt and directly
a $100 per day fine to accrue against the attorney until the disclosure statement was
filed); Curtis v. Illumination Arts, Inc., 2013 WL 1148802, at *2 (W.D.Wash. Mar

Shannon – Judging Third-Party Funding

2016]

JUDGING THIRD-PARTY FUNDING

3/17/2015 12:17 AM

33

parties will make the required corporate and third-party funding
disclosures.
The Advisory Committee referenced Rule 7.1 in its December 2014
report when rejecting the aforementioned proposal to revise Rule 26.157
The Advisory Committee’s statement supports this article’s assertion that
Rule 7.1 would be the appropriate Federal Rule in which to require that
parties supported by third-party funding must disclose to the judge the
identity of litigation funder. 158 Rule 7.1 explicitly orders corporate
parties to file a disclosure statement, so, until revisions are accomplished,
a local court rule should be implemented to include all parties, including
are natural persons or unincorporated associations for the purpose of
checking conflicts of interest relating to third-party funders. 159 The
purpose would be to notify the judge of the participation of the funder so
that he or she may determine if any conflicts of interest exist. 160
The Advisory Committee Notes accompanying Rule 7.1 suggest that
the disclosure is intended to be very limited—only enough to notify the
judge as to whether financial conflicts exist. 161 This disclosure will be
particularly crucial if consumer investment portfolios – such as pensions
and mutual funds – begin to include third-party funding as an alternative
investment source. 162 Such consumer investment in litigation is already
19, 2013); Medmarc Cas. Ins.Co. v. Sterling & Dowling PC, 2010 WL 3747754, at
*1 (S.D.Ill. Sept. 20, 2010) (threatening non-compliant party with dismissal of the
case); Hanratty v. Watson, 2010 WL 3522996, at *1 (S.D.Ill. Sept. 2, 2010)
(threatening party with striking appearance and jury demand); Feezor v. Big 5 Corp.,
2010 WL 308751, at *1-*3 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 15, 2010) (imposing modest monetary
sanction on non-disclosing defendant).
157
See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at 3 (“[Disclosure] will protect
against unknown conflicts of interest by ensuring judges have access to information,
not provided by Rule 7.1 disclosures, identifying third-party financing entities in
which the judge may have an interest.”).
158
Cf id.; see also U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Stopping the Sale on
Lawsuits: A Proposal to Regulate Third-Party Investments in Litigation (Oct. 2012),
at 14, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TPLF_Solutions.pdf
(suggesting that FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1 be revised to require parties to disclose thirdparty funding to the judge).
159
See FED R. CIV. P 7.1(a) (currently mandating that “[a] nongovernmental
corporate party” must file a disclosure statement; not referencing any other type of
parties, such as natural persons or unincorporated associations).
160
See supra note 61.
161
See Connelly v. Bender, 36 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
162
If all judges in a particular jurisdiction would be disqualified on the basis of
their consumer or retirement investments having a connection to the funder, then the
“rule of necessity” would intervene to allow a conflicted judge to hear the case to
ensure that a funded plaintiff would still have a forum. See U. S. v. Will, 449 U.S.
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possible under Title II and Title III of the 2012 Jumpstart Our Business
Startups (JOBS) Act, which allow individuals to make equity investments
in startups, which can include financing litigation.163 For example, there
is already one litigation funding company brokering third-party funding
arrangements under Title II of the JOBS Act between high-net worth
individual investors and plaintiffs who have already filed their cases. 164
Such high-net worth individual investors could be anyone – including
judges, attorneys, or jurors. 165
Rule 7.1 does not state whether the disclosure statement must be

200, 213 (1980) (“However, in the highly unusual setting of these cases, even with
the authority to assign other federal judges to sit temporarily under 28 U.S.C. §§
291–296 (1976 ed. and Supp. III), it is not possible to convene a division of the Court
of Appeals with judges who are not subject to the disqualification provisions of [28
U.S.C.] § 455. It was precisely considerations of this kind that gave rise to the Rule
of Necessity, a well–settled principle at common law that, as Pollack put it,
“although a judge had better not, if it can be avoided, take part in the decision of a
case in which he has any personal interest, yet he not only may but must do so if the
case cannot be heard otherwise.” F. Pollack, A First Book of Jurisprudence 270 (6th
ed. 1929).”) (quotation marks and citations in original). Furthermore, potential
jurors may also have a connection to the funder through their consumer or retirement
investments as well as their potential status as a former funded litigant. See, e.g.,
Letter, supra note 113, at 2-3 (stating that individual jurors may be shareholders of
a funder). A judge who has been notified regarding the participation of the funder
under FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1 can then determine whether it would be appropriate to
question the jurors under FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a) regarding their potential connections
to third-party funders. See FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a) (authorizing “the court … to
examine prospective jurors … itself”).
163
See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. 112-106, Apr. 5,
2012, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§77-78, 7213, 7262); see generally Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A
Market
for
Lemons?,
(Dec.
17.
2014
draft),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2539786.
164
See LexShares, How does the JOBS Act impact LexShares?,
https://lexshares.desk.com/customer/portal/articles/1543554-how-does-the-jobsact-impact-lexshares- (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (“The interests offered for sale
through LexShares rely upon an exemption under Rule 506(c) enabled by Title II of
the JOBS Act which went effective on September 23, 2013. This exemption permits
an issuer to engage in general solicitation or general advertising of the offering and
selling of securities pursuant to Rule 506, provided that (1) all purchasers of the
securities are accredited investors and (2) the issuer takes reasonable steps to verify
that such purchasers are accredited investors.”)
165
See supra note 162.
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served on the opposing party. 166 On one hand, at least one court has ruled
that Rule 7.1 does not require serving the disclosure statement on the
opposing party. 167 On the other hand, at least one observer of the industry
has proposed amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to include a
requirement that funding relationships be disclosed to the opposing
party. 168 The argument that funding should be disclosed to the other side
rests on the assumption that a secretly funded party may have a tactical
advantage in the litigation. 169 This is not a compelling reason, however,
for disclosing funding to the other side. Parties have all sorts of tactical
advantages in litigation for which disclosure to the other side is not
required simply in the name of leveling the playing field. The source of
funding – whether from a third-party funder or otherwise – is not
discoverable information, because the participation of the funder is not
relevant or material to the merits of the case. 170 Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) is
the sole exception, requiring a defendant to disclose its liability
insurance. 171 The rule contemplates insurers who would pay the
underlying judgment if the defendant loses. 172 In most instances,
however, defense-side third-party funding would not be discoverable
under this rule, because the vast majority of funders that fund defendants
only fund legal expenses and costs, not the underlying judgment against
a losing defendant. In the rare instance in which a funder does agree to
pay the underlying judgment, then the funding arrangement would rightly
be classified as liability insurance and subject to disclosure under Rule
26(a)(1)(A)(iv). 173 Nevertheless, this interpretation would not require
any change to the existing federal rule on disclosing the defendant’s
liability insurance, nor would it require disclosure of other types of
funding arrangements to the opposing side.
In sum, the disclosure under the amended Rule 7.1 should be limited
to disclosure, in camera, of the identity of the funder to the judge only,
not to the other side, at the same time as the party's first appearance in or
communication with the court, as currently stated in the existing rule. If
166

See
FED R. CIV. P.
7
(discussing
only
the
content
(and timing of the disclosure; nothing about to whom the disclosure must or may be
shared).
167
See, e.g., Plotker v. Lamberth, 2008 WL 4706255, at *12 (W.D.Va. 2008)
(holding that service is not required because the statements are only to assist judges
in determining whether must be disqualified from hearing the case).
168
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
169
Id.
170
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
171
See FED R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv).
172
Id.
173
Id.
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a funder enters or withdraws from a pending case, the party would be
required to notify the judge of this changed circumstance under the
existing language of Rule 7.1(b)(2). 174 The judge should not share this
information with the other party, as the existing rule does not require such
a disclosure. 175 If there is a financial conflict of interest, the judge will
recuse himself or herself and the other side does not need to know the
reason. 176 This disclosure is enough to prevent the situation in which a
later conflict of interest requires the judge to recuse herself or a losing
party challenges the final judgment on the same basis. 177 Yet, it is not
enough to create a situation in which parties are required to disclose their
funding sources to each other (except for the defendant’s liability
insurance). 178 Courts may also implement local rules requiring more
extensive disclosures than those enumerated in Rule 7.1. 179 Such local
rules can implement these proposed reinterpretations in advance to bridge
the gap between the existing Rule 7.1 and a potential future amendment.
Furthermore, disclosure of the identity of the funder to the judge is
sufficient; the actual terms of the funding arrangement need not be
disclosed. The purpose of the disclosure is to avoid additional costs for
the party by identifying judicial conflicts of interest before pursuing the
case through to a judgment that may be challenged because of
undisclosed conflicts of interest.180 The identity of the funder is key for
determining conflicts of interest, not the terms of the funding
arrangement. 181 At least one observer has suggested that a particularly
unscrupulous funder could try to fund both sides of a case in order to
hedge its investment. 182 Under my proposed reinterpretation, since all
funded parties would have a duty to disclose the identity of their funders
to the judge, the judge would learn whether the same funder is funding
more than one side of the case. In that specific situation, given the
potential for a single funder secretly to manipulate both sides of a case to
achieve a certain outcome, the judge could rightly notify both funded
parties regarding the identity of their common funder.
174

See supra note 155.
Id.
176
The “rule of necessity” will ensure that the case will be heard if all judges in a
given jurisdiction or court have a relationship to the funder. See supra note 162.
177
See supra notes 61 and 176.
178
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
179
See FED R. CIV. P. 7.1, Advisory Committee note (2002 amendments).
180
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
181
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
182
This observation was made by a participant at the Washington and Lee
Roundtable on Third-Party Funding of Litigation and Arbitration on November 7-8,
2013.
175
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2. Arbitration: Arbitrator Disclosure Statements to Parties
One of the major distinctions between litigation and arbitration is
that arbitrators go through a two-step process of nomination and
confirmation before they see any of the documents filed in the case,
whereas the plaintiff in litigation cannot typically vet the judge before
filing the case with the court. The two-step process for appointing
arbitrators gives parties and arbitral institutions the opportunity to detect
potentially problematic conflicts of interest before the case has gone too
far into the merits and before the parties have spent much money on the
case. 183 The nomination and confirmation process seeks to identify
potential independence and impartiality issues, which parties can either
waive (in most instances) or use to disqualify the arbitrator from
consideration for that particular case. 184 A similar procedure exists to
183

See, e.g., Jennifer A. Trusz, Note, Full Disclosure? Conflicts of Interest
Arising from Third-Party Funding in International Commercial Arbitration, 101
Geo L.J. 1649, 1666-67 (2013) (discussing the procedure for disqualifying a
potential arbitrator or challenging a sitting arbitrator under the major rules for
international commercial arbitration).
184
See, e.g., International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce
(ICC),
Arbitration
Rules,
Art.
11(2)-(3)
(2012),
http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/iccrules-of-arbitration/ [hereinafter ICC Rules] (potential arbitrator must ”disclose in
writing to the Secretariat any facts or circumstances which might be of such a nature
as to call into question the arbitrator’s independence in the eyes of the parties, as
well as any circumstances that could give rise to reasonable doubts as to the
arbitrator’s impartiality” and has an ongoing obligation to disclose any such
circumstances that arise during the course of the arbitration); LCIA Rules, supra note
148, at Art. 5.4-5.5 (potential arbitrator must disclose “any circumstances currently
known to the candidate which are likely to give rise in the mind of any party to any
justifiable doubts as to his or her impartiality or independence” and has an ongoing
obligation to disclose any such circumstances that arise during the course of the
arbitration); ICDR Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 13.2-13.3 (potential arbitrator
must ”disclose any circumstances that may give rise to justifiable doubts as to the
arbitrator’s impartiality or independence and any other relevant facts the arbitrator
wishes to bring to the attention of the parties” and has an ongoing obligation to
disclose any such circumstances or facts that arise during the course of the
arbitration); HKIAC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 11.1 (“An arbitral tribunal
confirmed under these Rules shall be and remain at all times impartial and
independent of the parties.”); HKIAC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 11.4 (potential
arbitrator must “disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts
as to his or her impartiality or independence” and has an ongoing obligation to
disclose any such circumstances that arise during the course of the arbitration); SIAC
Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 10.4-10.5 (potential arbitrator must disclose “any
circumstance that may give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or
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some extent for judges when one of the parties is a corporate entity that
must file a disclosure statement under Federal Rule 7.1. The main
difference is the timing; the judge is already in place at the time of the
Rule 7.1 filing, so the appropriate course of action in the event of a
conflict of interest would be for the judge to recuse herself. 185 There is
also a “rule of necessity,” meaning that if all judges in a
particular jurisdiction would be disqualified from the same reason, then
any judge can hear the case. 186
In order to cause the least disruption and cost for the parties, ideally,
any conflicts of interest relating to the funder’s involvement should be
addressed before the appointment of the arbitrator. 187 Otherwise, the
arbitrator may be challenged and (if the challenge is successful) replaced,
increasing the time, cost, and inconvenience of the parties to the case.188
Thus, the arbitrator should disclose connections, if any, that it has to the
third-party funder in the case prior to the arbitrator’s confirmation. 189
One source of guidance regarding arbitrator disclosure obligations
is the International Bar Association’s (IBA) revised Guidelines on

independence as soon as reasonably practicable” and has an ongoing obligation to
disclose any such circumstances that arise during the course of the arbitration); SCC
Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 14(2)-(3) (potential arbitrator must disclose “any
circumstances which may give rise to justifiable doubts as to his/her impartiality or
independence” and has an ongoing obligation to disclose any such circumstances
that arise during the course of the arbitration).
185
See supra note 61.
186
See supra note 162.
187
See Trusz, supra note 183 at 1652 (“Because of the potential disruption of the
arbitration and the possibility of annulment, nonrecognition, and nonenforcement of the award, conflicts of interest should be addressed prior to the
appointment of the arbitrator.”)
188
See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 184, at Art. 14(1) (a sitting arbitrator may be
challenged “for an alleged lack of impartiality or independence, or otherwise”);
LCIA Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 10.1 (sitting arbitrator may be challenged if
“circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to that arbitrator’s
impartiality or independence”); ICDR Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 14.1 (“A party
may challenge an arbitrator whenever circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable
doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.”); HKIAC Rules, supra
note 148, at Art. 11.6 (“Any arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances exist that
give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence...”);
SIAC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 11.1 (“Any arbitrator may be challenged if
circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s
impartiality or independence...”); SCC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 15(1) (sitting
arbitrator may be challenged “if circumstances exist which give rise to justifiable
doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence”).
189
See supra note 89.
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Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, which took effect on
November 28, 2014. 190 These guidelines are not mandatory in any
arbitration proceedings; parties or arbitrators can choose to reference
them or ignore them altogether. The IBA revised several of its guidelines
to require arbitrators to disclose to parties their connections with thirdparty funders in order to check for potential conflicts of interest. 191 The
IBA revised one of its guidelines to require funded parties to disclose the
identity of their third-party funder to the arbitrator, so that the arbitrator
may assess potential conflicts of interest. 192 The explanatory statement
to one of the guidelines defines a “third-party funder” as “any person or
entity that is contributing funds, or other material support, to the
prosecution or defence [sic] of the case and that has a direct economic
interest in, or a duty to indemnify a party for, the award to be rendered in
the arbitration.” 193
Arbitral institutions and rules may wish to borrow or reference the
IBA’s definition of third-party funder in the guidance that they provide
with their instructions to arbitrators regarding disclosures pursuant to a
nomination, so that arbitrators under their auspices will know what type
of relationships to disclose, even if the parties have not agreed to use the
IBA Rules. 194 Similarly, the arbitrator needs to know about the
involvement of the third-party funder in order to disclose any potential
conflicts of interest, so arbitral institutions should require parties to
disclose the identity of their third-party funders to their arbitrator.195
Thus, arbitration rules should implement a corporate party disclosure rule
similar to this article’s proposed reinterpretation of Federal Rule 7.1; such
an arbitration rule would require a funded party to disclose the identity of
its third-party funder to the arbitrator. 196 This would enable the arbitrator
to make the appropriate disclosures to avoid conflicts of interest. 197 At
190

See generally IBA Guidelines, supra note 89.
See id. at General Standard 6; the Explanation to General Standard 6; the
Waivable Red List § 2.2.3; the Orange List §§ 3.2.2, 3.4.3, and 3.4.4 (requiring an
arbitrator to disclose its connections to third-party funders, defined as entities with
a “direct economic interest in the award to be rendered in the arbitration”).
192
See id. at General Standard 7 (requiring a funded party to disclose its
connection to a third-party funder, defined as an entity with a “direct economic
interest in the award to be rendered in the arbitration”).
193
Id. at Explanation to General Standard 6.
194
Id.
195
See Trusz, supra note 195183, at 1655 (discussing how an arbitrator cannot
disclose a connection with a third-party funder unless the arbitrator is made aware
of the funder’s participation in the case).
196
See supra Part V.B.1.
197
See supra note 89.
191
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least one scholar has proposed changing international arbitration rules to
address
arbitrator
conflicts
of
interest
within
the
198
existing institutional arbitration rules.
Except for mandatory disclosures relating to conflicts of interest,
arbitrators have wide latitude to tailor the proceedings to the parties’
needs, which may include choosing to ignore the participation of a thirdparty funder. 199 For example, unlike in United States litigation, arbitral
198

See Trusz, supra note 195183, at 1652, 1673 (“The four-prong proposal begins
with a duty by the arbitrator to disclose any past and current relationships with thirdparty funders to the institution. Second, the arbitral rules should provide that any
party receiving outside funding must disclose to the institution that relationship and
any potential conflicts involving the third-party funder. Third, the arbitral rules
should require automatic review of potential third-party funding conflicts that are
triggered by the party’s disclosure of a funding relationship. The institution would
be required to keep all funding information confidential. Finally, in order to
incentivize third-party funders to disclose the relationship, the arbitral rules should
provide that such relationships cannot be considered in tribunal decisions for awards
on costs or security for costs. The proposal is then slightly modified to adapt to ad
hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules.”); see also Marc J. Goldstein,
Should the Real Parties in Interest Have To Stand Up?—Thoughts About a
Disclosure Regime for Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration, 8
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., Oct. 2011, at 4, 8 (suggesting that institutions could
“require parties and counsel to disclose the identity of any financer involved,
and require arbitrator nominees to disclose to the institution the identity of any
financers with whom they or their law firms have relationships” so that if a conflict
of interest exists, “the institution could decline to confirm the arbitrator, without
disclosure of the reasons to the parties”).
199
See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 184, at Art. 22(1)-(2) (“The arbitral tribunal
and the parties shall make every effort to conduct the arbitration in an
expeditious and cost-effective manner, having regard to the complexity and value of
the dispute. In order to ensure effective case management, the arbitral tribunal, after
consulting the parties, may adopt such procedural measures as it
considers appropriate, provided that they are not contrary to any agreement of the
parties.”); LCIA Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 14.4(ii) (arbitral tribunal has “a duty
to adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the arbitration, avoiding
unnecessary delay and expense, so as to provide a fair, efficient and expeditious
means for the final resolution of the parties’ dispute.”); LCIA Rules, supra note 148,
at Art. 14.5 (“The Arbitral Tribunal shall have the widest discretion to discharge
these general duties, subject to such mandatory law(s) or rules of law as the Arbitral
Tribunal may decide to be applicable; and at all times the parties shall do everything
necessary in good faith for the fair, efficient and expeditious conduct of the
arbitration, including the Arbitral Tribunal’s discharge of its general duties.”); ICDR
Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 20.1 (“Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may
conduct the arbitration in whatever manner it considers appropriate, provided that
the parties are treated with equality and that each party has the right to be heard and
is given a fair opportunity to present its case.”); HKIAC Rules, supra note 148, at
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tribunals generally refrain from allowing the revelation of a third-party
funder to sway their decision regarding awarding costs or ordering
security for costs. 200 However, if an arbitral tribunal did decide to
consider the participation of the third-party funder, then it would have the
power to allocate costs for or against a particular party on that basis. 201
Art. 13.5 (“The arbitral tribunal and the parties shall do everything necessary to
ensure the fair and efficient conduct of the arbitration.”); HKIAC Rules, supra note
148, at Art. 13.1 (“Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal shall adopt suitable
procedures for the conduct of the arbitration in order to avoid unnecessary delay or
expense, having regard to the complexity of the issues and the amount in dispute,
and provided that such procedures ensure equal treatment of the parties and afford
the parties a reasonable opportunity to present their case.”); SIAC Rules, supra note
148, at Art. 16.1 (“The Tribunal shall conduct the arbitration in such manner as it
considers appropriate, after consulting with the parties, to ensure the fair,
expeditious, economical and final determination of the dispute.”).
200
Compare Trusz supra note 1 at 1677-79 (discussing arbitral tribunals declining
to consider the participation of a third-party funder when awarding costs or ordering
security for costs, although some funders choose to incorporate security for costs
into their business arrangements as a matter of good governance or cost of doing
business) with Abu-Ghazaleh v. Chaul, 36 So. 3d 691, 693-94 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009)
(holding that the litigation funder was a “party” under Florida law for the purpose of
allocating costs, because the funder had substantially “controlled” the litigation).
201
See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 184, at Art. 37(3) (“At any time during the
arbitral proceedings, the arbitral tribunal may make decisions on costs, other than
those to be fixed by the Court, and order payment.”); ICC Rules, supra note 184, at
Art. 37(5) (“In making decisions as to costs, the arbitral tribunal may take into
account such circumstances as it considers relevant, including the extent to
which each party has conducted the arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effective
manner.”); LCIA Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 25.1-25.2 (arbitral tribunal has the
power “to order any respondent party to a claim or cross-claim to provide security
for all or part of the amount in dispute, by way of deposit or bank guarantee or in
any other manner,” to order a “cross-indemnity,” and to order “security for Legal
Costs and Arbitration Costs”); LCIA Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 28.2 (“The
Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the proportions in which the parties shall bear such
Arbitration Costs.”); LCIA Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 28.3 (“The Arbitral
Tribunal shall also have the power to decide by an award that all or part of the legal
or other expenses incurred by a party (the “Legal Costs”) be paid by another party.”)
(parentheses and quotation marks in original); LCIA Rules, supra note 148, at Art.
28.4 (“The Arbitral Tribunal shall make its decisions on both Arbitration Costs and
Legal Costs on the general principle that costs should reflect the parties’ relative
success and failure in the award or arbitration or under different issues, except where
it appears to the Arbitral Tribunal that in the circumstances the application of such
a general principle would be inappropriate under the Arbitration Agreement or
otherwise.”); ICDR Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 20(7) (“The arbitral tribunal may
allocate costs, draw adverse inferences, and take such additional steps as are
necessary to protect the efficiency and integrity of the arbitration.”); ICDR Rules,
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C. Judging Cost Allocation and Sanctions
1. Litigation: Fee Shifting, Sanctions, and Class Action Litigation
Since funders pay upfront the attorney fees, filing fees, evidentiary
fees, and other costs of the funded party, many questions arise regarding
how the participation of the funder should affect the allocation of costs,
if at all. Should the funder pay the penalty for conduct by the funded
party or its attorney that the court sanctions under Rule 11 or Rule 37?
Should the funder be reimbursed if the funded party would be entitled to
reimbursement of attorney fees under Rule 54? Should the funder of a
successful class action receive a portion of the judicially-approved
attorney fees under rule 23? This Section addresses the impact of thirdparty funding on fee shifting, sanctions, and class action litigation.
Rule 54(d)(2)(B)(iv) requires that, in order for a winning party to
recover attorney’s fees, the party must “disclose, if the court so orders,
the terms of any agreement about fees for the services for which the claim
supra note 148, at Art. 34 (“The arbitral tribunal shall fix the costs of arbitration in
its award(s). The tribunal may allocate such costs among the parties if it determines
that allocation is reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case.”);
HKIAC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 24 (“The arbitral tribunal may make an order
requiring a party to provide security for the costs of the arbitration.”); HKIAC Rules,
supra note 148, at Art. 33.2 (“The arbitral tribunal may apportion all or part of
the costs of the arbitration referred to in Article 33.1 between the parties if it
determines that apportionment is reasonable, taking into account the circumstances
of the case.”); HKIAC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 33.3 (“With respect to the costs
of legal representation and assistance ..., the arbitral tribunal, taking into account the
circumstances of the case, may direct that the recoverable costs of the arbitration, or
any part of the arbitration, shall be limited to a specified amount.”); SIAC Rules,
supra note 148, at Art. 24(k)-(l) (tribunal may order a party to pay security for costs
or security for all or part of the amount in dispute); SIAC Rules, supra note 148, at
Art. 31.1 (“Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the Tribunal shall determine in
the award the apportionment of the costs of the arbitration among the parties.”);
SIAC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 33 (“The Tribunal shall have the authority to
order in its award that all or a part of the legal or other costs of a party be paid by
another party.”); SCC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 43(5) (“Unless otherwise agreed
by the parties, the Arbitral Tribunal shall, at the request of a party, apportion the
Costs of the Arbitration between the parties, having regard to the outcome of the
case and other relevant circumstances.”)(emphasis added); SCC Rules, supra note
148, at Art. 44 (“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the Arbitral Tribunal may
in the final award upon the request of a party, order one party to pay any reasonable
costs incurred by another party, including costs for legal representation, having
regard to the outcome of the case and other relevant circumstances.”)(emphasis
added).
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is made.” 202 The language "if the court so orders" highlights that judge
must decide whether any such fee agreement must be divulged. 203 Since
the essence of the funding agreement is paying attorney's fees, the
funding agreement is an "agreement about fees for the services for which
the claim is made." 204 Thus, a winning funded party seeking
reimbursement for attorney fees would be required to disclose the
existence of the funding arrangement, "if the court so orders," in order to
recover those attorney's fees. 205 Enforcement of this requirement could
be accomplished under the existing language of Rule 54(d)(2)(B)(iv) or
by appending the phrase "including third-party funding" to the end of the
sentence. Local rules may also supply specific requirements regarding
the disclosure of the third-party funding agreement in the context of a
claim for attorney's fees. 206
In additional to making the winning party whole, an award of
attorney fees is commonly used to sanction a party. 207 The fundamental
question with regard to sanctions is whether a funder should be liable for
sanctions imposed on the funded party or the funded party's attorney if
the funder directed or condoned the sanctioned conduct. Sanctioning the
party or its attorneys increases the litigation costs. Presumably, those
costs would be borne by the funder under the terms of the funding
arrangement, as long as the sanctioned action was within the bounds of
the funding arrangement. 208 Regardless, as currently worded, Rules 11
and 37 likely do not reach third-party funders directly, but rather
indirectly by punishing the funded party or its attorney and incurring
additional costs for the funder. 209
Rule 11 sanctions misconduct relating to papers presented to or filed
with the court. 210 Rule 11(c)(1) authorizes a court to sanction attorneys,
202

See FED R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(iv).
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
See FED R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2) (“By local rule, the court may establish special
procedures to resolve re-related issues without extensive evidentiary hearings.”)
207
See e.g., Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at 6 (referring to FED. R.
CIV. P. 68, which currently provides for the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s attorney
fees if the plaintiff rejects the defendant’s settlement offer and the fails to obtain a
better judgment).
208
Cf. Shannon, supra note 29, at 115 n.71 and accompanying text.
209
Id.
210
See FED R. CIV. P. 11(a) (stating that if a paper is not signed, “[t]he court must
strike any unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected after being
called to the attorney’s or party’s attention); FED R. CIV. P. 11(b) (“an attorney or
unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information
203
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law firms, or parties; the rule does not list any other persons. 211 Rule 11
should not be revised to apply to funders, because funders take no direct
action in court and make no representations to the court. 212 The Advisory
Committee notes state that, in appropriate circumstances, courts may
impose sanctions on the "person" – other than the party or attorney –
found to be responsible for the violation of Rule 11. 213 This could apply
directly to the funder if there were proof that the funder directed the action
or if the funder takes a very active role in the litigation. However, the
funder's actions would have to be directly tied to the paper or document
in question. 214 There has been at least once case in which the funder was
so involved in the case that court treated the funder as a party for the
purpose of allocation cost, but not for sanctions under Rule 11. 215 The
funding agreement may address payment for monetary sanctions and
would probably govern the disposition of sanctions-related issues that
arise between funders and funded parties. 216 As such, the court may
consider the participation of the funder if the court wishes to take into
account the financial status of the funded party or its attorney when
assessing monetary sanctions against them. 217
Rule 37 governs sanctions for failure to cooperate with discovery

and belief,” the “pleading, written motion, or other paper” presented to the court
meets the four conditions listed in the rule).
211
See FED R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (“[T]he court may impose an appropriate sanction
on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the
violation.”)
212
The sole exception is if the funder has taken an assignment of the claim and is
the named party in the dispute.
213
See FED R. CIV. P. 11, Advisory Committee Notes (1993 Amendments)
(“When appropriate, the court can make an additional inquiry in order to determine
whether the sanction should be imposed on such persons, firms, or parties either in
addition to or, in unusual circumstances, instead of the person actually making the
presentation to the court. For example, such an inquiry may be appropriate in cases
involving governmental agencies or other institutional parties that frequently impose
substantial restrictions on the discretion of individual attorneys employed by it.”).
214
See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
215
See Abu-Ghazaleh v. Chaul, supra note 200, at 693-94 (holding that the thirdparty funder was a “party” under Florida law for allocating costs, because the funder
had substantially “controlled” the litigation); see also Letter, supra note 113, at 6.
The vast majority of funders are very careful not to control the litigation in order to
avoid causing attorneys to violate rules of professional responsibility, so the AbuGhazaleh is considered an outlier.
216
Cf. Shannon, supra note 29, at 115 n.71 and accompanying text.
217
Cf. id.
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requests. 218 Rule 37 authorizes sanctions on a deponent, 219 a witness, a
party, an officer or employee of a party, or a party's attorney; the rule
does not list any other persons. 220 Thus, like Rule 11, the wording of
Rule 37 does not contemplate sanctioning a third-party funder. The
funder does not participate directly in discovery, so it would be
inappropriate to revise Rule 37 to authorize sanctioning the funder
directly. 221 If the opposing party can demonstrate that the fault lies with
the funder – for example, if the party cannot perform certain discovery
functions due to the funder’s refusal to pay for a particular document
production or witness travel – it may be possible to require the funder to
pay the party's discovery sanctions. 222 However, it would likely be very
difficult to prove that the funder is at fault and may require additional
discovery that would needlessly increase the time and cost of the
litigation. As mentioned above, the funding agreement may address
payment for monetary sanctions and would probably govern the
disposition of sanctions-related issues that arise between funders and
funded parties. 223
Finally, there is a potential for third-party funding to have an impact
on class actions, although class actions are not a very attractive market
for funders in the United States. Rule 23 governs class action
218

See generally, FED R. CIV. P. 37.
A deponent is the person who is to be questioned during a deposition.
220
See FED R. CIV. P. 37(b)(1) (sanctioning a “deponent”); FED R. CIV. P.
37(b)(2)(A) (sanctioning “a party’s officer, director or managing agent – or a witness
designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(B)
(sanctioning “a party”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (requiring “a disobedient party,
the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, caused by the failure”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1) (sanctioning “a
party”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(c)(2) (sanctioning “a party”); FED R. CIV. P.
37(d)(1)(A)(i) (sanctioning “a party or a party’s officer, director or managing agent
– or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(f)
(sanctioning “a party or its attorney”).
221
See FED R. CIV. P. 37(b)(1) (sanctioning a “deponent”); FED R. CIV. P.
37(b)(2)(A) (sanctioning “a party’s officer, director or managing agent – or a witness
designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(B)
(sanctioning “a party”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (requiring “a disobedient party,
the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, caused by the failure”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1) (sanctioning “a
party”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(c)(2) (sanctioning “a party”); FED R. CIV. P.
37(d)(1)(A)(i) (sanctioning “a party or a party’s officer, director or managing agent
– or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(f)
(sanctioning “a party or its attorney”).
222
Cf. supra note 221.
223
See supra note 216.
219
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proceedings. 224 While funders in other jurisdictions frequently fund the
class itself, funders in the United States have shied away from directly
funding the class representative for a variety of reasons that are beyond
the scope of this article. 225 More commonly, funders back the law firm
representing the class instead of funding the class directly. 226 Given the
extensive judicial oversight over class actions – including approving the
class certification, the class counsel, the settlement, and the amount of
attorney fees awarded – there is not yet a need to revise the class action
rule to take into account third-party funding.
Rule 23(h), in conjunction with Rule 54(d)(2)(C), govern the
prevailing party's recovery of attorney's fees in a class action case.227
Regardless of the structure of the arrangement, the funder has actually
paid the litigation costs, including the attorney's fees. 228 Thus, having
the entire amount of the attorney's fees awarded to the law firm would be
unjust enrichment under contract law. The funder would be paid from
the attorney’s fees awarded, so judges already, in essence, have oversight
over the funder’s fee. The funder should be reimbursed at least the
amount actually spent on attorney's fees. However, the funder's
entitlement to payment would be founded on its contractual rights
through the funding arrangement rather than an entitlement to receive
reimbursement for attorney's fees under Rule 23. Given the attorney
ethical prohibition on fee sharing, the attorney would likely not be able
to pay the funder directly from its judicially awarded fee. Thus, since the
judge already has broad oversight over the attorney's fee, the judge should
have discretion over the amount of the fee allotted from the class award
that would go to the funder.
In the future, it may be appropriate to state explicitly that judges
have oversight over the participation of funders in class action litigation.
However, direct funding of class actions is not yet very prevalent in the
United States, so amending Rule 23 to address the issue would be
224

See generally FED R. CIV. P. 23.
See e.g., NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 10, at 74-84 (discussing funding
of class and group actions in Australia), 120-21 (mentioning that class action
litigation and class arbitration are nonexistent in the United States), 180-81
(discussing funding under the “Class Action Act” in the Netherlands), 185-86
(discussing class action funding in Canada).
226
For an in-depth treatment of lawyer lending, see, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom,
Re-Re-Financing Civil Litigation: How Lawyer Lending Might Remake the
American Litigation Landscape, Again, 61 UCLA REV. DISC. 110 (2013); Nora
Freeman Engstrom, Lawyer Lending: Costs and Consequences, 63 DEPAUL L. REV.
377 (2014).
227
See FED R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(C) and FED R. CIV. P. 23(h).
228
See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 10, at 4-11.
225
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premature. Courts already have complete control over the awarding of
attorney’s fees in the class action context. 229 At present, the judge’s
influence over the creation and maintenance of class action suits
demonstrates that the judge would have control over relationships formed
between class clients and their "representatives," including funders. 230
2. Arbitration: Cost Shifting, Security for Costs, and Class Arbitration
The disclosure of the third-party funder typically arises in relation
to cost allocation, either before or after the arbitration proceedings. In
situations in which the third-party funder is disclosed voluntarily (or
accidentally), the opposing non-funded party sometimes then petitions
the arbitral tribunal to order security for costs. 231 Furthermore, if the nonfunded party wins, then it may request that the tribunal order payment of
costs by the funded party or even the funder directly. 232 A few
international arbitration tribunals have ordered funders to post security
for costs in advance of the proceedings, and some third-party funders
view paying security for costs as a simply a cost of doing business in
jurisdictions that follow the English (“loser pays”) cost allocation rule. 233
Some jurisdictions allow funders to be joined to cost proceedings and for
funders to issue cost orders against funders. 234 Thus, with respect to
disclosure to the opposing party, the existing practice appears to be for
arbitral tribunals to address the issue when allocating costs on a case-bycase basis. Given the trend in arbitration rules worldwide of giving
arbitrators wide discretion in determining cost allocation, adopting a
specific cost allocation rule addressing third-party funding would be
counterproductive.
Finally, class arbitration is funded in several jurisdictions worldwide
but not in the United States for reasons beyond the scope of this paper. 235
229
230

See FED R. CIV. P. Rule 23(g)(1)(D).
For the definition of “representatives,” see supra note 135 and accompanying

text.
231

See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 10, at xix-xx, 4, 12-13, 23-24, 2728, 30, 33 n.16, 61, 74-75, 82-83 (discussing examples of how security for costs and
adverse costs orders under the English rule of cost allocation may be addressed in
the funding agreement).
232
See id.
233
See id.
234
See supra note 215.
235
Third-party funding of class actions is not yet prevalent in the United States,
but the practice is widespread in other leading third-party funding jurisdictions such
as Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, The Future
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In all the jurisdictions outside the United States in which class action
funding is allowed, the participation of the funder is usually disclosed to
the decision maker and the opposing side, although the terms of the
funding agreement need not necessarily be disclosed. 236 Class arbitration
is not prevalent in the United States in light of recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence making class arbitration jurisdiction nearly impossible to
create. 237 Thus, third-party funding for class arbitrations seated in the
United States is likely to continue to be nonexistent.
D. Judging Enforcement
Enforcement is where litigation and arbitration converge, and
successful enforcement is required for the third-party funder to receive
any payment. Both litigation judgments and arbitral awards are enforced
by courts, because arbitrators do not have the power to enforce their own
awards. 238 In both litigation and arbitration, there is no requirement that
the judgment or award reference the participation of a third-party funder,
and there is no requirement of disclosure that the proceedings were
funded in order for enforcement to be effective. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the United States Constitution requires all states to honor the
judgments of the courts of other states. 239 Thus, enforcing a funded state
court judgment—even in another state that disallows third-party
funding—should not be difficult.
In arbitration, a winning party may encounter difficulties, however,
when trying to enforce a funded arbitral award in a jurisdiction that has
of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306 (2011); Jasminka Kalajdzic, Peter Cashman & Alana
Longmoore, Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Australian, Canadian and
U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 93 (2013); Michael Legg
& Louisa Travers, Necessity is the Mother of Invention: The Adoption of Third-Party
Litigation Funding and the Closed Class in Australian Class Actions, 38 COMMON
L. WORLD REV. 245 (2009); Michael J. Legg, Shareholder Class Actions in
Australia—The Perfect Storm?, 31 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 669 (2008); Ianika N.
Tzankova, Funding of Mass Disputes: Lessons from the Netherlands, 8 J.L. ECON.
& POL’Y 549 (2012).
236
See supra note 225.
237
See e.g., Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010)
(ruling that class arbitration jurisdiction is not proper unless class arbitration is
expressly written into all of the parties’ signed arbitration agreements, including
every single class member).
238
See infra note 242.
239 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1.

Shannon – Judging Third-Party Funding

2016]

JUDGING THIRD-PARTY FUNDING

3/17/2015 12:17 AM

49

express laws or a public policy against funding, but only if the enforcing
court finds out about the funder’s involvement or that some of the
awarded money will go to a funder. Many jurisdictions find distasteful
the idea that some money from the award or judgment will go to a private
entity that became involved in the case solely for profit, even if the
practice was legal at the procedural seat of the arbitration and under the
applicable substantive law. 240
The New York Convention has a public policy exception by which
an enforcing court can decline to enforce an otherwise valid arbitral
award if the award somehow violates public policy in that court’s
jurisdiction. 241 For example, the United States has implemented the New
York Convention domestically through Chapter 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Notably, the FAA incorporates by reference
key provisions of the New York Convention, such as in 28 U.S.C. § 207,
which states that, “the court shall confirm the award unless it finds one
of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the
award specified in the said Convention.” 242 This language refers to the
See generally, Catherine A. Rogers, Gamblers, Loan Sharks & Third-Party
Funders, in CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
(2014); W. Bradley Wendel, Alternative Litigation Finance and AntiCommodification Norms, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 655 (2014).
241 See, e.g., Trusz supra note 183 at 1668 (discussing the grounds for vacating an
arbitral award under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act due to the “partiality”
or “corruption” of the arbitrators); Trusz supra note 183 at 1669 (discussing grounds
for non-enforcement of an arbitral award under the New York Convention relating
to an arbitrator’s connection to a third-party funder); United Paperworkers Int’l
Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987) (“A court’s refusal to enforce
an arbitrator’s award under [an arbitration] agreement because it is contrary to public
policy is a specific application of the more general doctrine, rooted in the common
law, that a court may nonrefuse to enforce contracts that violate law or public
policy.”).
242 See e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 207 (2012) (Federal Arbitration Act sections on
enforcing arbitration awards). In addition, the 1958 Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, commonly known as the “New York
Convention,” is the main vehicle for enforcement of arbitration awards worldwide.
At the time of this writing, 154 countries have signed the New York Convention.
For a current list of signatories to the New York Convention, see Status: Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958),
UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status
.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). Third-party funding is also prevalent in investorstate arbitration, which is typically authorized by a treaty and most often takes place
under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, also known as the “ICSID Convention” or the
240
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“public policy” exception found in Article V.2.b of the Convention,
which states that the court may sua sponte deny enforcement if “the
recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country [where enforcement is sought].” 243
Some jurisdictions, like Hong Kong, explicitly allow third-party
funding in international arbitration while generally prohibiting the
practice in domestic litigation. 244 In contrast, other jurisdictions, like
Singapore, currently prohibit third-party funding in all forums, including
international arbitration. 245 Most countries fall somewhere in between.
The current regulatory landscape in the United States is unclear at best,
but it appears that the laws in roughly two-thirds of the states would allow
third-party funding in international arbitration. 246 Given the limited
grounds for vacating or setting aside an international arbitration award
under the Federal Arbitration Act, addressing third-party funding in
international arbitration through domestic arbitration laws would be
unnecessary. 247 As mentioned in Part V.B.2, one of those grounds for
refusing enforcement of an arbitral award is the revelation of an
undisclosed conflict of interest that leads to the appearance that the

“Washington Convention,” which presently has 159 signatories. For a current list
of signatories to the ICSID Convention, see Member States, ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/Pages/Database-of-MemberStates.bak.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
243 See supra note 242.
244 NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 10, at 227–31 (addressing the laws on
third-party funding in Hong Kong).
245 Id. at 237–38 (addressing the laws on third-party funding in Singapore); but
see, “Review of the International Arbitration Act: Proposals for Public
Consultation,” Ministry of Law of the Singapore Government,
http://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/assets/documents/linkclick
f651.pdf (soliciting public comment on a proposed amendment to allow third-party
funding in international arbitration cases over 1 million Singapore dollars, subject
to certain restrictions and requirements).
246 See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 10, at 144–159 (presenting a stateby-state survey of the laws regarding third-party funding, including all 50 states and
the District of Columbia).
247 See generally, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012); New York Convention¸ infra note 242.
For international arbitration, promulgating guidelines at the international level
through arbitral institutions and international bar associations would most effective.
For an example of a global effort to create such guidelines for international
arbitration, see Third-Party Funding Task Force, infra note 251.
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arbitrator is biased. 248 Thus, any relationship between an arbitrator and a
third-party funder should be disclosed at the outset. 249
Given the privacy of arbitration, the author has yet to hear of an
example of a court declining to enforce an arbitral award purely due to
the involvement of a third-party funder, but there is a possibility that it
may have happened in private already or that it will happen in the future.
In addition, arbitral institutions and arbitrators have a duty to work to
ensure the enforceability of arbitral awards to the extent that
enforceability is within their control. 250 If we have clear standards for the
involvement of third-party funders throughout the conduct of the dispute
resolution procedures to allay concerns regarding due process and undue
interference, then a court will be less likely to decline to enforce a
judgment or award in the future simply on the basis of a funder’s
involvement.
VI. CONCLUSION: JUDGING THE FUTURE OF THIRD-PARTY FUNDING
Through the foregoing rule reinterpretations, judges and arbitrators
will position themselves to identify and observe instances of third-party
funding in their “natural habitat” – during the litigation or arbitration
proceedings. Furthermore, they will be able to observe ordinary, routine
third-party funding instances, which will likely lead to more universal
regulatory insights than the few outlier third-party funding instances
revealed by accident or through a party’s settlement strategy. Over time,
248

See Trusz, supra note 183, at 1652 (discussing how an undisclosed arbitrator
conflict of interest with a funder may cause the award to be annulled or denied
recognition or enforcement).
249
See IBA Guidelines, supra note 89, and accompanying text.
250
See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 184, at Art. 41 (“In all matters not expressly
provided for in the Rules, the Court and the arbitral tribunal shall act in the spirit
of the Rules and shall make every effort to make sure that the award is enforceable
at law.”); LCIA Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 32.2 (“...the LCIA Court, the LCIA,
the Registrar, the Arbitral Tribunal and each of the parties shall act at all times in
good faith, respecting the spirit of the Arbitration Agreement, and shall make every
reasonable effort to ensure that any award is legally recognised and enforceable at
the arbitral seat.”); HKIAC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 13.8 (“The arbitral tribunal
shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that an award is valid.”); SIAC Rules,
supra note 148, at Art 37.2 (“...the President, the Court, the Registrar and the
Tribunal shall act in the spirit of these Rules and shall make every reasonable effort
to ensure the fair, expeditious and economical conclusion of the arbitration and the
enforceability of any award.”); SCC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 47 (“...the SCC,
the Arbitral Tribunal and the parties shall act in the spirit of these Rules and shall
make every reasonable effort to ensure that all awards are legally enforceable.”).
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these observations will answer many of society’s pressing questions to
reveal the true systemic impact of third-party funding. How prevalent is
third-party funding? What is the effect of third-party funding on parties,
counsel, procedures, and outcomes in dispute resolution? What benefits
and problems can we identify? Are those benefits and problems different
or the same as we predicted or surmised? Should those benefits be
incentivized and those problems be regulated, and if so, how? We
currently cannot answer these questions without more data. Thus, the
rule reinterpretations proposed in this article should be viewed as an
interim regulatory structure with the goal of gleaning more data about the
prevalence, structures, and impact of third-party funding within litigation
and arbitration through disclosure and observation. This data would
inform the next step of regulation, such as correcting, tailoring, or
revising existing rules.
Although rule revisions are far off, this article concludes by
providing a few suggestions for revisions for the Advisory Committee on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and arbitral institutions to consider
in the future. First, a working definition of a “third-party funder” and
“third-party funding” would be very helpful. Funders and funding take
so many different forms, however, that proposed uniform definitions may
be over- or under-inclusive. 251 Still, defining these two terms is likely
crucial to any comprehensive regulatory effort. In addition, regulations
should incorporate the same definitions of these two terms to clarify the
type of arrangement to which all the regulations are referring. This will
create cohesion and uniformity within the proposed regulatory scheme.
An example of a potentially useful definition can be found in the revised
International Bar Association’s Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in
International Arbitration. 252 The definition states that a third-party funder
“may have a direct economic interest in the award…” and would be “any
person or entity that is contributing funds, or other material support, to
the prosecution or defence [sic] of the case and that has a direct economic
251

This comment was made during the February 12, 2014 and February 12, 2015
meetings of the Third-Party Funding Task Force (http://www.arbitration-icca.org/
projects/Third_Party_Funding.html).The international arbitration community hopes
to devise a set of guidelines or rules for the practice. See also IBA Guidelines, supra
note 89 and accompanying text.
252
See IBA Guidelines, supra note 89, at Explanation to General Standard 6(b),
(“Third-party funders and insurers in relation to the dispute may have a direct
economic interest in the award, and as such may be considered to be the equivalent
of the party. For these purposes, the terms ‘third-party funder’ and ‘insurer’ refer to
any person or entity that is contributing funds, or other material support, to the
prosecution or defence [sic] of the case and that has a direct economic interest in, or
a duty to indemnify a party for, the award to be rendered in the arbitration.”).
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interest in, or a duty to indemnify a party for, the award to be rendered in
the arbitration.” 253
Second, the rules should be revised to require funded parties to make
disclosures to the decision maker. The funded party should be required
to disclose to the judge or arbitrator the identity of the third-party funder,
so that the judge or arbitrator can determine whether he or she has a
connection to the funder that would require recusal. A funded party
should be required to disclose the third-party funding arrangement to the
judge or arbitrator if that party claims attorney fees under applicable law
and if the judge or arbitrator orders disclosure of any fee arrangements.
Disclosure of third-party funding to the opposing side should not be
mandatory, because the participation of the funder is not material to the
merits of the underlying dispute. 254 However, the parties may come to an
enforceable agreement during the pretrial conference regarding the
disclosure or confidentiality of funding arrangements. 255 Furthermore, in
order to prevent waiver of evidentiary privileges for information shared
with the funder, funders should be included within the exceptions to the
waiver of evidentiary privileges, which would require amending the
common law rather than the Federal Rules. 256 Arbitration borrows
evidentiary privileges from national laws around the world based on the
preferences of the parties and arbitrators, so revising arbitration rules to
address evidentiary privileges would be unnecessary and would likely
violate the trans-substantive principle of litigation and arbitration rules of
procedure. 257
253

Id.
See supra Part V.A.1.
255
See FED. R. CIV. P. 16; FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
256
See supra Part V.A.1.
257
Compare Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975) (“We have become so transfixed
by the achievement of James Win. Moore and his colleagues in creating, nurturing,
expounding and annotating a great trans-substantive code of procedure that we often
miss the persistent and inevitable tension between procedure generalized across
substantive lines and procedure applied to implement a particular substantive end.
There are, indeed, trans-substantive values which may be expressed, and to some
extent served, by a code of procedure. But there are also demands of particular
substantive objectives which cannot be served except through the purposeful
shaping, indeed, the manipulation, of process to a case or to an area of law. What
follows is by no means an attempt to denigrate or undermine the ongoing transsubstantive achievement of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather it is an
exploration to rediscover the feel of a tension.”) with Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.,
Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2244 (1989) (“The second principal criticism
of the Federal Rules is that they indiscriminately govern all kinds and types of
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This article has suggested various reinterpretations of and revisions
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and rules of arbitration procedure
to address issues relating to the phenomenon of third-party funding. Rule
revisions are likely not to happen anytime soon, but fortunately, the
existing Federal Rules and rules of arbitration provide a framework for
judges and arbitrators to handle potential third-party funding issues as
they arise. In addition, both litigation and arbitration rules provide for
the judge or arbitrator to use local procedural rules and devise case-bycase solutions to novel problems for which there is no formal rule on
point. These existing features of dispute resolution will help ensure that
decision makers can address any issues that may arise, even without
revisions to the procedural rules. As the third-party funding industry
grows and matures, rule revisions may be needed, particularly in the
context of funded class action litigation under Federal Rule 23 and funded
class arbitration, if those phenomena become more prevalent. Careful
observation and documentation of the participation of third-party funders
in the dispute resolution system will be an integral and essential part of
any future consideration of relevant revisions to litigation or arbitration
rules. 258 In the meantime, this article has demonstrated that decision
makers already have the tools that they need to begin observing and
addressing issues of third-party funding by reinterpreting existing
framework of litigation and arbitration rules.

litigation, whereas civil procedure rules properly constructed would be shaped to the
needs of specific categories of litigation. This critique contemplates separate sets of
rules for civil rights cases, antitrust cases, routine automobile cases, and so on. The
criticism has been expressed perhaps most incisively by Professor Robert Cover,
esteemed colleague prematurely gone from us. Yet despite the great respectability
of its source, the ‘trans-substantive’ critique seems misguided to me. It overstates
the reach of the Federal Rules and underestimates the technical and political
difficulties of trying to tailor procedures to specific types of controversies.”). Cf.
supra note 71 regarding the trans-substantivity of arbitration.
258
Cf., Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules Agenda Book, supra note 68, at 79
(“The Conference also prompted a project launched by the Committee and the
National Employment Lawyers Association to develop protocols for initial
discovery in individual employment cases. The protocols were developed by a team
of lawyers evenly balanced between those who commonly represent employees and
those who commonly represent employers. The protocols have been adopted by
numerous District Judges; experience with the protocols has led to calls for more
widespread adoption, and the hope that similar protocols might be developed for
other categories of litigation. These programs of education and innovative pilot
projects continue.”).

